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ABSTRACT 
 Democracy stands at a critical juncture in the current environment of mis-, dis-, 
and mal-information spreading in the media ecosystem and intensifying disaster 
challenges. This thesis examines how democratic governments can maintain legitimacy 
after a catastrophic disaster in the age of false information. It uses the comparative case 
study method to evaluate three international catastrophic disaster responses—the 2011 
Tōhoku earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear power plant disaster in Japan; the Australian 
wildfires of 2019–2020; and the COVID-19 response in the United States beginning in 
2020—within the analysis frameworks for democratic principles, crisis leadership, 
sensemaking, and the social production of disasters. This thesis finds that the 
combination of ineffective disaster response, poor leadership, and false information can 
undermine socially constructed legitimacy, amplify and intensify existing social divides, 
and create instability and distrust of the government. This thesis proposes a model of 
social response to disasters that recommends networked responder actions to uphold 
democratic institutions and legitimacy when citizens have been affected by chaos and 
uncertainty in the operational and information environments. It recommends building 
trust and resilient communities through sensemaking, meaning-making, adaptation, 
community stabilization, and ethics and equity. 
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Trust in governments worldwide is declining, thus undermining the social, 
economic, and political institutions of democracies and, therefore, the legitimacy of 
governments.1 Income inequality is also widening around the world, leading to increased 
individual and societal vulnerability, decreased resilience, and mass protests.2 
Simultaneously, catastrophic disasters are increasing in frequency and challenging disaster 
response agencies to align resources with ethical and equitable principles. Additionally, 
false information—known as mis-, dis-, and mal-information—is spreading rapidly 
through social media and other platforms, potentially damaging legitimacy by further 
eroding trust. Challenges to the legitimacy of democratic states are more likely to occur—
or increase—when strategic response efforts are ineffective in the immediate aftermath of 
a disaster or when individual or governmental resilience is low.3 As such, democracy 
stands at a critical juncture in the current environment where mis-, dis-, and mal-
information throughout the media ecosystem intensifies or exacerbates disaster challenges. 
Fortunately, however, crises also expose underlying vulnerabilities in the social, economic, 
and political institutions of a democracy and provide an opportunity for reforms.  
The complex ecosystems of disaster response and recovery, media and social 
media, and individual and community vulnerability and resilience in a crisis interact to 
challenge democratic governments. The scholarly literature reviewed for this thesis first 
focuses on governmental legitimacy in a democracy and the effect and role of 
communications via social media in a crisis and other online platforms, as well as disaster 
challenges to legitimacy and resilience. It next explores disaster response, including the 
ethical application of response resources, as well as individual resilience and vulnerability 
to disasters. Finally, it tackles the evolving topics of misinformation, disinformation, and 
 
1 “Trust in Government,” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, accessed 
January 13, 2021, http://www.oecd.org/gov/trust-in-government.htm. 
2 “Rising Inequality Affecting More Than Two-Thirds of the Globe, but It’s Not Inevitable: New UN 
Report,” United Nations, January 21, 2020, https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/01/1055681. 
3 Arjen Boin et al., The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership under Pressure 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 3. 
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malinformation, including definitions, the purpose and means of spreading these types of 
false information, and methods to counter them. This review consistently examines the 
common themes of social and political structures and leadership, as well as individual and 
governmental vulnerability, resilience, trust, sensemaking, and narratives. 
This thesis uses the comparative case study method to evaluate three international 
catastrophic disaster responses.4 Each of these cases were selected because the countries 
possessed stable democratic governments that experienced a significant disaster event in 
which false information was spread over social media. It examines the following cases: the 
2011 Tōhoku earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear power plant disaster in Japan; the 
Australian wildfires of 2019–2020; and the ongoing coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-
19) response in the United States that began in 2020.  
This thesis employs four frameworks to analyze these case studies, including 
democratic principles, crisis leadership, sensemaking, and the social production of 
disasters. First, Linz and Stepan’s framework describes social, economic, and political 
institutions that contribute to the legitimacy of a state, along with other conditions such as 
bureaucracy and rule of law.5 The second is crisis leadership—which Boin et al. describe 
as sensemaking, decision-making and coordinating, meaning-making, accounting, and 
learning.6 The third framework illustrates how individuals inside and outside the disaster-
affected area perform sensemaking through communication platforms such as social 
media.7 Fourth, Tierney’s social production of disaster is used to emphasize the social 
impacts and aspects of a disaster—rather than its physical effects—to evaluate the 
 
4 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 4th ed., Applied Social Research 
Methods Series, vol. 5 (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2009). 
5 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 
40. 
6 Boin et al., The Politics of Crisis Management, 14–15. 
7 Andrew D. Brown, Ian Colville, and Annie Pye, “Making Sense of Sensemaking in Organization 
Studies,” Organization Studies 36, no. 2 (February 2015): 266, https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840614559259. 
xvii 
influences of vulnerability and resilience on individuals and communities after a disaster.8 
These frameworks enable the comparative analysis of these case studies. 
This case study analysis finds that false information and complex disasters 
compound vulnerabilities, disrupt societal structures, and exceed the national capacity to 
provide for the basic needs of citizens. This comparative case study analysis reveals a 
weakened democracy in the United States yet stable democracies in Australia and Japan. 
Each of these disasters triggered significant disruptions to the national social, economic, 
and political systems required to support a fully functioning democracy. Although all three 
governments maintained legitimacy following the disasters examined, national leaders and 
governments lost credibility and trust. In addition, these disasters and the effects of mis-, 
dis-, and mal-information disrupted the social and economic institutions of democracy 
through wide-ranging effects on citizens—societal disruptions, degraded social structures, 
and economic losses, combined with significant disaster-related expenses—especially 
among vulnerable populations.  
This research concludes that socially constructed legitimacy can be undermined by 
forces that amplify and intensify existing social divides and create instability, including 
false information and disasters that alter the environment and social structures. However, 
governments and individuals can support democratic legitimacy by countering disruptions 
caused by false information and disasters. Counteracting such disruptions involves 
sensemaking and constructive meaning-making, building social relationships and 
cohesion, enhancing community involvement in disaster response, and taking actions to 
stabilize the situation that provide for the basic needs of survivors and societal recovery. 
In order to combat these effects on citizens and democracy, responders should 
deliver an effective disaster response by enacting an equitable, ethical distribution of 
resources that meets the basic needs of citizens and by rapidly adapting to the situation and 
clearly communicating. These actions result in the delivery of resources, through funding 
and direct support, that build citizen trust and support of their governments. Additionally, 
responders must consider the needs of the community including individual vulnerabilities, 
 
8 Kathleen Tierney, Disasters: A Sociological Approach (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019), 66. 
xviii 
resilience, and equity in the disaster response. These actions enhance governmental 
resilience, enabling democratic states to maintain legitimacy and trust when affected by a 
crisis such as a disaster or attacks that leverage false information. There is no single method 
for ensuring resilience or legitimacy; governments must tailor their approaches and be 
prepared to adapt to new or emerging situations to enhance and support affected 
communities.  
This thesis proposes a model for individual, community, and government networks 
to evaluate the effects of disaster and false information on democratic institutions and to 
strengthen and uphold the integrity of their democracies in times of crisis. This model 
describes disaster responder actions and networks that will effectively sustain democracy 
when citizens are harmed by the combined forces of severe or catastrophic disasters and 
mis-, dis-, and mal-information. Kathleen Tierney describes the severity of disasters in 
terms of the “social production of disasters” in which the emphasis is on “social structures 
and social processes” rather than the physical effects of a disaster.9 This model builds on 
Tierney’s principles and the other primary frameworks to propose a social response to 
disasters, which describes responder actions that enable networks to uphold democratic 
institutions when challenged by disasters and false information.  
Each of the model’s components contributes to the culminating goal of maintaining 
state legitimacy by building trust and resilient communities. These components include the 
relationship of responder actions—including sensemaking, meaning-making, adaptation, 
community stabilization, and ethics and equity—to the social, political, and economic 
institutions of a democracy. Similarly, the model describes the relationship of the 
components of responder networks—volunteers and community responders, online and in-
person communities, and governments—to these same institutions. Implementing the 
social response to disasters model requires collaboration among responder networks, which 
contribute to the successful implementation of the responder actions described in this 
model, to uphold the integrity of their democracies in times of crisis.  
 
9 Tierney, 66. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The legitimacy of a government is severely tested in the aftermath of a catastrophic 
disaster that significantly disrupts infrastructure, impacts the lives of survivors, and results 
in long-term disruptions to the economy. Democracy is at a critical juncture in the current 
environment when disaster challenges are combined with mis-, dis-, and mal-information 
spreading throughout the media ecosystem, eroding trust. Fortunately, however, crises also 
provide an opportunity for reforms and exposure of underlying vulnerabilities in the social, 
economic, and political institutions of a democracy. False information spread via social 
media platforms, the effectiveness of disaster response and recovery, and individual and 
community vulnerability and resilience in a crisis challenge democratic legitimacy. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Challenges to legitimacy are more likely to occur when strategic response efforts 
are ineffective in the immediate aftermath of a disaster or when individual or governmental 
resilience is low. Additionally, the frequency and impact of catastrophic disasters on 
individuals and communities are intensifying, in part due to the changing climate and 
associated risks and vulnerabilities, thereby increasing the likelihood of legitimacy 
challenges to governments.1 For example, 2020 was an unprecedented year for disasters, 
with $95 billion in damages from 22 incidents across the country.2 Earlier, in Louisiana 
after Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the response was widely deemed ineffective and 
inefficient across all levels of government, leading to conclusions that the government had 
failed to take the proper initiative to provide needed support for survivors and had been 
slow to respond and adapt to this significant disaster.3 Similarly, the media and the public 
 
1 Adam B. Smith, “2020 U.S. Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters in Historical Context,” 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, January 8, 2021, https://www.climate.gov/news-
features/blogs/beyond-data/2020-us-billion-dollar-weather-and-climate-disasters-historical. 
2 Smith. 
3 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select 
Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Report No. 
109–377 (Washington, DC: House of Representatives, 2007), https://www.congress.gov/congressional-
report/109th-congress/house-report/377/1. 
2 
deemed the governmental and international response ineffective following the Indian 
Ocean tsunami in 2004, Chile’s 2010 earthquake and tsunami, and Haiti’s 2010 
earthquake.4 Moreover, Carlin, Love, and Zechmeister found that the 2010 earthquake in 
Chile created instability through public criticism of democratic structures and individual 
politicians, which undermined public support of democratic norms and, by extension, the 
democratic government itself.5 Following Hurricane Maria in 2017, the government 
response received similar widespread criticism in the face of preparedness challenges that 
influenced response capacity in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.6 International 
state or domestic non-state adversaries might capitalize on the hectic environments of such 
catastrophic disasters and the resulting unstable environments to destabilize governments 
to achieve their own strategic goals. Such nefarious actors might weaken powerful 
governments, foment regime change, destabilize a region, or undermine alliances, using 
such global threats as cyber capabilities, online influence operations, counterintelligence 
from foreign state actors, or kinetic attacks.7 Increasing disasters combined with responses 
that are viewed as ineffective and adversarial attacks that leverage the destabilizing effects 
of disasters have the potential to challenge democratic legitimacy or even destabilize states. 
Indeed, following a catastrophic disaster, the right capabilities—including life-
saving resources such as health and medical teams and equipment and life-sustaining 
resources such as food, water, and shelter—must be applied at the right time and location 
to support a return to normalcy and encourage economic recovery. Without the capabilities 
to support these goals, the national response will be ineffective. Often, when capabilities 
 
4 Ryan E. Carlin, Gregory J. Love, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, “Natural Disaster and Democratic 
Legitimacy: The Public Opinion Consequences of Chile’s 2010 Earthquake and Tsunami,” Political 
Research Quarterly 67 (2013): 5, https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912913495592; Saptarishi Bandopadhyay, 
“After the Storm,” Aeon, February 5, 2019, https://aeon.co/essays/disaster-relief-as-a-threat-to-state-
sovereignty. 
5 Carlin, Love, and Zechmeister, “Natural Disaster and Democratic Legitimacy,” 3. 
6 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2017 Hurricane Season: FEMA After-Action Report 
(Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/
files/2020-08/fema_hurricane-season-after-action-report_2017.pdf. 
7 Daniel R. Coats, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Committee (Washington, DC: 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2019), https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-
SFR---SSCI.pdf. 
3 
are not applied correctly, it is because governments initially lack sufficient resources or 
misunderstand disaster impacts. When resource shortfalls and poor situational awareness 
combine with disinformation campaigns and cyber or kinetic attacks, the government’s 
capability to respond effectively and maintain legitimacy falters. Similarly, the resilience 
levels of a government and the people affected by the disaster may either increase or 
decrease challenges to the government’s legitimacy. Greater resilience, for example, would 
buffer the governmental structure against the impacts of adversarial campaigns.8  
Recent disasters illustrate that mis-, dis-, and mal-information influence the 
public’s perception of disaster conditions. Following the Ebola outbreak in 2018–2019, 
researchers found that low trust in local authorities combined with misinformation had 
influenced individual behaviors such as vaccination rates and requests for medical 
interventions.9 Similarly, during the 2020 Australian wildfires, disinformation on social 
media spread theories that arson or government-controlled burns had spawned the 
conflagrations or that climate change played no role in their severity and spread.10 
Additionally, low trust in the government and an email originating from outside the country 
to spread disinformation led to civil unrest in Ukraine at the outset of the coronavirus 
disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak, demonstrating adversaries’ ability to combine 
 
8 Resilience is defined, for the purposes of this thesis, as the intersection of vulnerability that exists 
before an event, the incident’s impacts, and the capacity for adapting to the post-event environment. 
Legitimacy is defined by Max Weber and other modern political theorists, as well as the Department of 
Defense, which links legitimacy to compliance with peace agreements and other arrangements. See Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Joint Planning, JP 5-0 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017), https://www.jcs.mil/
Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp5_0.pdf?ver=ztDG06paGvpQRrLxThNZUw%3d%3d; Fran H. 
Norris et al., “Community Resilience as a Metaphor, Theory, Set of Capacities, and Strategy for Disaster 
Readiness,” American Journal of Community Psychology 41, no. 1–2 (March 2008): 127–50, https://doi.
org/10.1007/s10464-007-9156-6. 
9 Patrick Vinck et al., “Institutional Trust and Misinformation in the Response to the 2018–19 Ebola 
Outbreak in North Kivu, DR Congo: A Population-Based Survey,” Lancet Infectious Diseases 19, no. 5 
(May 2019): 529–36, https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(19)30063-5. 
10 Derek Weber et al., “#ArsonEmergency and Australia’s ‘Black Summer’: Polarisation and 
Misinformation on Social Media,” in Disinformation in Open Online Media: Proceedings of the 
Multidisciplinary International Symposium on Disinformation in Open Online Media, ed. M. van Duijn et 
al., Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 12259 (Cham: Springer, 2020), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-
030-61841-4_11. 
4 
disinformation with a natural disaster incident to incite turmoil.11 Adversarial governments 
have the capability to conduct cyber-attacks and use social media for disinformation 
campaigns, information warfare, and the weaponizing of personal information. These 
examples demonstrate that adversaries can leverage disasters to launch a secondary attack 
to achieve strategic goals.  
This research seeks to establish novel solutions or emerging practices and factors 
for governments to maintain legitimacy following a catastrophic disaster in an era of 
increased mis-, dis-, and mal-information and other adversarial actions. It provides 
recommendations to governments for how to establish and encourage resilience and 
ultimately strengthen legitimacy after a calamity. These recommendations for maintaining 
legitimacy build on previous research about community resilience and ethical decision-
making in disaster response for effective response operations. Although each of these 
factors—legitimacy, catastrophic disasters, and mis-, dis-, and mal-information—has been 
studied separately, these topics have not been examined together. This thesis fills a gap in 
the existing research by examining these relationships to reveal whether actions can be 
taken to strengthen democracies before, during, or after disasters.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can democratic governments maintain legitimacy after a catastrophic disaster 
in the age of mis-, dis-, and mal-information? 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis uses the comparative case study method to evaluate three international 
catastrophic disaster responses.12 Each of the cases in this thesis appears here because the 
country possessed a stable democratic government that experienced a significant disaster 
event in which false information was spread over social media. These democratic 
 
11 Patrick Reevell, “Hysteria over Coronavirus Sparks Violent Protests in Ukraine,” ABC News, 
February 21, 2020, https://abcnews.go.com/International/hysteria-coronavirus-sparks-violent-protests-
ukraine/story?id=69124337. 
12 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 4th ed., Applied Social Research 
Methods Series, vol. 5 (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2009). 
5 
governments had at least moderate stability prior to the disaster and displayed a historic 
ability to withstand challenges to citizen confidence. Each government experienced a major 
or catastrophic disaster that strained government and private sector resources and had the 
potential to affect or disrupt its democracy—as opposed to a less-significant disaster with 
only a minor impact on local or regional governments. Last, each case involved social 
media in the sensemaking and meaning-making processes for the state, which experienced 
effects from mis-, dis-, or mal-information spread on these platforms. Drawing on media 
sources and government reports as well as research literature, this thesis evaluates the 
significance of disaster consequences and response for each case, including the effects of 
the disaster, the vulnerability of the population, and the quality of the whole-of-community 
response. It then reviews the effects of the disaster on the social, economic, and political 
institutions of democracy, further evaluating the political institutions by examining 
leadership and trust as well as government functions. Finally, it reviews the prevalence of 
mis-, dis-, and mal-information in each disaster. The following cases appear in this thesis: 
the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear power plant disaster in Japan; the 
Australian wildfires of 2019–2020; and the ongoing COVID-19 response in the United 
States that began in 2020.  
This thesis employs four frameworks to analyze these case studies, including 
democratic principles, crisis leadership, sensemaking, and the social production of 
disasters. First, Linz and Stepan’s framework describes social, economic, and political 
institutions that contribute to the legitimacy of a state, along with other conditions such as 
bureaucracy and rule of law.13 This framework, combined with an evaluation of trust in 
the governments, forms the analytical foundation of the effects of these disasters on 
legitimacy. The second framework is crisis leadership—which Boin et al. describe as 
sensemaking, decision-making and coordinating, meaning-making, accounting, and 
learning.14 Disaster coordinating agencies and others perform these actions and enable the 
 
13 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 
40. 
14 Arjen Boin et al., The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership under Pressure 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 14–15. 
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governments’ disaster response and recovery in these cases. The third framework illustrates 
how individuals inside and outside the disaster-affected area perform sensemaking through 
communication platforms such as social media, enabling the evaluation of the effects of 
mis-, dis-, and mal-information on these democratic governments.15 Fourth, Tierney’s 
social production of disaster is used to emphasize the social impacts and aspects of a 
disaster—rather than its physical outcomes—to evaluate the effects of vulnerability and 
resilience on individuals and communities after a disaster.16 
This thesis begins by seeking to understand the operational environment of a major 
disaster and the potential impact on governments based on previous research into the effect 
of disasters on government legitimacy and by examining the impacts of effectiveness and 
efficiency on the outcome of the disaster response. Because this is an emerging field, the 
academic literature about the long-term effects of false information on a disaster is scarce. 
This thesis examines how mis-, dis-, and mal-information could undermine democracies 
following a disaster and makes policy recommendations for protecting against these 
effects. The intended audience for these recommendations includes democratic states such 
as the United States and foreign governments. 
D. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The following chapters explore the intersecting forces of disasters and false 
information on democratic legitimacy. Chapter II explores scholarly research on these 
themes, including the evolving topics of governmental legitimacy; social media; disaster 
response, including individual and community resilience and vulnerability; and mis-, dis-, 
and mal-information. Chapter III describes the nature and extent of the three case studies 
and analyzes the effects of the disaster, response efforts, and false information on 
democratic institutions. Finally, Chapter IV discusses the findings drawn from previous 
chapters, summarizes the conclusions drawn from this research, proposes a model, and 
proposes recommendations and opportunities for future research. 
 
15 Andrew D. Brown, Ian Colville, and Annie Pye, “Making Sense of Sensemaking in Organization 
Studies,” Organization Studies 36, no. 2 (February 2015): 266, https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840614559259. 
16 Kathleen Tierney, Disasters: A Sociological Approach (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019), 66. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This review of the scholarly literature focuses first on the topics of governmental 
legitimacy in a democracy and the effect and role of communications in a crisis via social 
media and other online platforms, as well as disaster challenges to legitimacy and 
resilience. It next explores disaster response, including the ethical application of response 
resources as well as individual resilience and vulnerability to disasters. Finally, it tackles 
the evolving topics of misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation, including 
definitions, the purpose and means of spreading these types of false information, and 
methods to counter them. This review consistently examines the common themes of social 
and political structures and leadership, as well as individual and governmental 
vulnerability, resilience, trust, sensemaking, and narratives. 
A. LEGITIMACY 
This section provides an analysis of the scholarly debates on the definition of 
legitimacy, the role of social media in influencing legitimacy, and the factors that affect 
governmental legitimacy before, during, and after a crisis. It focuses on the effect of 
disasters on governmental legitimacy; additional debates surrounding governmental 
failures resulting from other types of crises are not included here. 
1. Definition 
March and Olsen establish their definition of a political institution, such as a nation-
state, as the adherence of the populace to structures and rules, a commonality of culture 
based on values and views, a common purpose established between citizens, or a 
combination thereof.17 They further describe these institutions as “socially constructed.”18 
Max Weber, one of the originators of this concept, agrees that legitimacy is socially 
constructed when he writes that only citizens can grant legitimacy to a state. He describes 
 
17 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “Elaborating the ‘New Institutionalism,’” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Political Institutions, ed. Sarah A. Binder, R. A. W. Rhodes, and Bert A. Rockman (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548460.003.0001. 
18 March and Olsen. 
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three ways that citizens grant legitimacy: habit, confidence in a leader, and belief in the 
system and its rules.19 Scholars have since challenged Weber’s typology of authority and 
recommended additions to his list. Sebastián G. Guzmán recommends that a fourth type of 
authority be added to account for authoritative leaders and other trusted figures such as 
medical doctors, who he describes as “substantive-rational,” or deriving authority from 
charisma and the ability to navigate rules or norms and abstract values.20 Juan J. Linz 
elaborates on the contributions of social, economic, and political institutions to 
legitimacy—which is granted by citizens—and their impact on the stability of governments 
vis-à-vis regime changes.21 Linz and Stepan tailor this description of legitimacy to describe 
the five components of democracy: “a lively civil society, a relatively autonomous political 
society, a rule of law, a usable state, and an economic society.”22 The social and political 
science literature defines how individuals maintain the legitimacy of political institutions 
through support and attentiveness. 
Practical definitions, however, also shed light on the implications of legitimacy for 
political institutions such as governments. For example, the Department of Defense links 
legitimacy to compliance with peace agreements and other arrangements.23 According to 
Christensen and Laegreid, the legitimacy of political institutions is closely interrelated with 
trust, which manifests in citizens’ level of satisfaction with government support, such as 
social services, and engagement with political systems and demographics.24 Francesca 
Granelli further expands on the relationship between individuals and institutions, defining 
the process of individual trust-building in institutions as both a rational and a “social 
 
19 H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (London: Taylor & 
Francis, 1948), 78–79, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203759240. 
20 Sebastián G. Guzmán, “Substantive-Rational Authority: The Missing Fourth Pure Type in Weber’s 
Typology of Legitimate Domination,” Journal of Classical Sociology 15, no. 1 (February 2015): 73–95, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1468795X14531695. 
21 Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration—An 
Introduction (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 12. 
22 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 17. 
23 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Planning. 
24 Tom Christensen and Per Laegreid, “Trust in Government: The Relative Importance of Service 
Satisfaction, Political Factors, and Demography,” Public Performance & Management Review 28, no. 4 
(June 2005): 487–511. 
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practice that requires creation, development, and maintenance.”25 Furthermore, a decline 
in trust can lead directly to a decline in legitimacy whereby citizens no longer comply with 
rules, citizen support of policy-making and efforts to enhance social structures weaken, 
and economic support of individual and business actions through innovation and 
technology dwindles.26 As Newton states, “Trust makes it possible to maintain peaceful 
and stable social relations that are the basis for collective behaviour and productive 
cooperation.”27 Similarly, Fathali M. Moghaddam points out, “Trust is integral to the 
social capital that enables dense social interconnections to develop and a healthy 
democracy to function.”28 Charles Tilly takes this further, saying “a significant decline in 
trust threatens democracy.”29 
Trust in the system of government is particularly important when the government 
faces a crisis, such as a disaster. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) highlights that trust is especially important in a crisis situation 
because a lack of trust can hamper response and recovery efforts and diminish the capacity 
of the government to respond to the crisis.30 Similarly, Boin et al. reference this connection 
in stating that after a crisis, the political system “must regain the necessary legitimacy to 
perform its usual functions.”31  
Although researchers describe different components and descriptions of legitimacy, 
they agree that the concept of legitimacy is socially constructed and that trust in political 
institutions is an important component. Trust, however, is not easily defined, and 
 
25 Francesca Granelli, “What Does It Mean for a Communication to Be Trusted?,” Defence Strategic 
Communications 5, no. 1 (Autumn 2018): 201, https://doi.org/10.30966/2018.RIGA.5. 
26 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Government at a Glance 2013 (Paris: 
OECD Publishing, 2013), 20, https://doi.org/10.1787/gov_glance-2013-en. 
27 Kenneth Newton, “Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society, and Democracy,” International Political 
Science Review 22, no. 2 (2001): 202, https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512101222004. 
28 Fathali M. Moghaddam, The Psychology of Democracy (Washington, DC: American Psychological 
Association, 2015), loc. 3721 of 5083, Kindle. 
29 Charles Tilly, Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 92–93, https://doi.org/
10.1017/CBO9780511804922. 
30 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Government at a Glance, 22. 
31 Boin et al., The Politics of Crisis Management, 19. 
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interpretations of this concept vary greatly. As Granelli states, “Trust is a deeply nuanced 
concept that underpins our daily interactions and communications. It influences how 
information is exchanged and absorbed, and in doing so, trust shapes our understanding of 
the world around us.”32 Further complicating the concept of trust, or trustworthiness, is the 
current environment of information spread over social media. 
2. Legitimacy and Crisis Communication Online 
Social media is increasingly a tool used by citizens and responders before, during, 
and after a crisis to understand the situation. The use of social media to understand the 
operational environment of a crisis is rooted in sensemaking or, as described by Brown, 
Colville, and Pye, the process by which “people seek plausibly to understand ambiguous, 
equivocal or confusing issues or events.”33 Boin et al. apply the sensemaking process to 
emergency management organizations as a way for individuals to assess crisis situations, 
making it possible to understand the interactions and dynamics of a disaster.34 Similarly, 
Starbird, Arif, and Wilson describe the role of social structures in guiding online 
communities and their conversations through the construction of social norms.35 Social 
media platforms, technology, and online communities influence and in turn are influenced 
by individuals throughout the sensemaking process. 
Because legitimacy is socially constructed, the prevalence and reach of information 
online means that it can quickly influence large numbers of citizens during a crisis. Huang 
et al. find that social media is an accessible and expedient way to share information between 
users, creating a valuable platform for sharing information during a crisis.36 Boin et al. 
 
32 Granelli, “What Does It Mean for a Communication to Be Trusted?,” 201. 
33 Brown, Colville, and Pye, “Making Sense of Sensemaking,” 266. 
34 Boin et al., The Politics of Crisis Management, 24. 
35 Kate Starbird, Ahmer Arif, and Tom Wilson, “Disinformation as Collaborative Work: Surfacing the 
Participatory Nature of Strategic Information Operations,” Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer 
Interaction 3, no. CSCW (2019): 5, 109, https://doi.org/10.1145/3359229. 
36 Y. Linlin Huang et al., “Connected through Crisis: Emotional Proximity and the Spread of 
Misinformation Online,” in Proceedings of the 18th ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative 
Work & Social Computing (Vancouver, BC: Association for Computing Machinery, 2015), 969, https://doi.
org/10.1145/2675133.2675202. 
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agree, highlighting the role of coordinating community support during a response, 
crowdsourcing and situational awareness, and preparedness messaging with the goal of a 
secure society.37 Starbird emphasizes the role of the community in collaborating and 
solving problems after a crisis, in a way similar to emergent responders arriving on the 
scene of an emergency through digital volunteerism, individuals support of crowdsourcing 
and collective intelligence, and human computation to solve complex problems.38  
Additionally, social media is increasingly the primary platform for individuals to 
access information during a crisis and crisis managers to share official information, as 
reported by Huang et al.39 Specifically, Arif et al. find that individuals use social media to 
“to share information about their own circumstances, to seek actionable information for 
their own response actions and about impacts to the people and places they care about, to 
request and offer assistance, and to seek and provide emotional support to others.”40 
Additionally, as Cho, Jung, and Park find, peer-to-peer communication replaces traditional 
government or top-down messaging, especially when infrastructure damages or 
communication network limitations make traditional channels unavailable.41  
Although social media is an important means for crisis communication, it can be 
used to undermine legitimacy by eroding trust through the spread of false or harmful 
information. For example, individuals who use social media during the initial collective 
sensemaking process of a crisis but have incomplete or ambiguous information may spread 
misinformation or rumors.42 Bratu finds that in addition to spreading rumors through social 
 
37 Boin et al., The Politics of Crisis Management, 84. 
38 Kate Starbird, “What ‘Crowdsourcing’ Obscures: Exposing the Dynamics of Connected Crowd 
Work during Disaster,” in Proceedings of Collective Intelligence (New York: Special Interest Group on 
Computer–Human Interaction, 2012), 1–2, http://arxiv.org/abs/1204.3342. 
39 Huang et al., “Connected through Crisis,” 970. 
40 Ahmer Arif et al., “A Closer Look at the Self-Correcting Crowd: Examining Corrections in Online 
Rumors,” in Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work and 
Social Computing (Portland: Association for Computing Machinery, 2017), 156, https://doi.org/10.1145/
2998181.2998294. 
41 Seong Eun Cho, Kyujin Jung, and Han Woo Park, “Social Media Use during Japan’s 2011 
Earthquake: How Twitter Transforms the Locus of Crisis Communication,” Media International Australia 
149, no. 1 (November 2013): 28, https://doi.org/10.1177/1329878X1314900105. 
42 Huang et al., “Connected through Crisis,” 970. 
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media, individuals are constrained by the information available within their networks, 
which can make it more difficult for official information to be synchronized and 
disseminated.43 Similar to Huang et al., Bratu finds that misinformation on social media 
can be corrected, either by the crowd or by dissemination of official information, but such 
corrections lag the spread of the incorrect information, allowing misinformation to spread 
rampantly.44 For these reasons, responders worry that social media provides the 
opportunity for the spread of misinformation that can lead to individuals’ taking 
unnecessary risks or complicating the response, as described by Starbird et al.45 
Additionally, the spread of harmful information by adversaries is recognized as a 
growing threat, especially to democratic governments. The 2019 Worldwide Threat 
Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Committee recognizes it as a threat to the United States:  
In the last decade, our adversaries and strategic competitors have developed 
and experimented with a growing capability to shape and alter the 
information and systems on which we rely. For years, they have conducted 
cyber espionage to collect intelligence and targeted our critical 
infrastructure to hold it at risk. They are now becoming more adept at using 
social media to alter how we think, behave, and decide.46 
Scholars particularly recognize Russia for leveraging online platforms for the purpose of 
“weakening trust and legitimacy in the U.S. democratic process and . . . deepen [ing] 
existing divisions within society.”47 Bayer et al. highlight a similar threat in European 
democracies, especially in the form of interference in referenda and elections.48 They 
further describe the aim to influence politics by state, non-state, domestic, and foreign 
 
43 Sofia Bratu, “The Critical Role of Social Media in Crisis Communication,” Linguistic and 
Philosophical Investigations 15 (2016): 233. 
44 Huang et al., “Connected through Crisis,” 970; Bratu, “The Critical Role of Social Media,” 233. 
45 Kate Starbird et al., “Could This Be True? I Think So! Expressed Uncertainty in Online Rumoring,” 
in Proceedings of the 2016 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (New York: 
Association for Computing Machinery, 2016), 361, https://doi.org/10.1145/2858036.2858551. 
46 Coats, Worldwide Threat Assessment, 5. 
47 Elizabeth Bodine-Baron et al., Countering Russian Social Media Influence (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, 2018), ix, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2740.html. 
48 Judit Bayer et al., Disinformation and Propaganda—Impact on the Functioning of the Rule of Law 
in the EU and Its Member States (Brussels: European Parliament, 2019), 9, 29. 
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actors as having the “intention of generating insecurity, tearing cohesion or inciting 
hostility, or directly . . . disrupt [ing] democratic processes.”49 Additionally, political 
groups leveraging disinformation or other manipulation to gain power may use their 
political power to undermine democracy.50 However, Colley, Granelli, and Althuis point 
out that although evidence suggests that disinformation spreads, little has shown the actual 
or specific impacts on democracies.51  
Scholars assume that disinformation reduces trust between citizens and 
governments, or institutional trust, and that it amplifies and intensifies existing societal 
divides.52 The complexity of social cohesion developed through online and offline 
relationships and community trust poses challenges to measuring the impact of 
disinformation.53 Tucker et al. also highlight the role of online communities in political 
participation within a democracy, asserting that social media along with polarization and 
disinformation can reduce political engagement, harming democracies.54 Colley, Granelli, 
and Althuis also assert that media literacy may actually serve to undermine democracy by 
making individuals less trusting of government-provided information and, thus, the 
government, especially as current trust in government is low.55  
Social media can aid or harm the legitimacy of an institution during a crisis. The 
sensemaking process during a crisis is increasingly moving online including the social 
media environment, allowing information to spread quickly and providing an opportunity 
for multiple sources to be consulted. However, social media also enables the rapid 
 
49 Bayer et al., 18. 
50 Bayer et al., 11. 
51 Thomas Colley, Francesca Granelli, and Jente Althuis, “Disinformation’s Societal Impact: Britain, 
COVID, and Beyond,” Defence Strategic Communications 8 (Spring 2020): 89, https://doi.org/10.30966/
2018.RIGA.8. 
52 Colley, Granelli, and Althuis, 92, 118. 
53 Bayer et al., Disinformation and Propaganda, 125. 
54 Joshua A. Tucker et al., Social Media, Political Polarization, and Political Disinformation: A 
Review of the Scientific Literature (Menlo Park, CA: Hewlett Foundation, 2018), 4, https://hewlett.org/
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dissemination of false information, potentially damaging legitimacy by further eroding 
trust.  
3. Disaster Challenges to Legitimacy 
Several factors contribute to the political impacts, including legitimacy challenges, 
of a crisis such as a disaster. The primary factor is the severity of a disaster, but researchers 
have identified other contributors. A comprehensive dissertation by Zahidul Arefin 
Choudhury focuses on legitimacy applied to the aftermath of a disaster.56 Choudhury 
identifies three factors in legitimacy crises after a major disaster: “frequency of disaster 
occurrence, the quality of the government response to disasters, and the type of regime 
within which the government operates.”57 Choudhury examines several case studies of 
historic major disasters, measuring political stability with the public’s reaction to the 
government’s disaster response.58 His research found that a disaster exposes the issues 
within government systems, illustrated through support for the government, the incumbent, 
or oppositional political parties.59  
Drury and Olson agree with a basic premise of Choudhury’s research—to focus 
only on legitimacy following major disasters. This research sought to establish that political 
unrest was linked to disaster severity. In examining six historic disaster cases, their model 
showed a direct link—with statistical significance—between the severity of disaster 
impacts and levels of political unrest as a result of the disaster.60 Their research found that 
political and social unrest comes from a combination of the severity of the disaster, 
pre-existing vulnerability within the government, and the capacity of the government as 
measured in level of development, freedom of the citizens, and assistance from the 
 
56 Zahidul Arefin Choudhury, “Politics of Natural Disaster: How Governments Maintain Legitimacy 
in the Wake of Major Disasters, 1990–2010” (PhD diss., University of Iowa, 2013), 
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57 Choudhury, 1. 
58 Choudhury, 121. 
59 Choudhury, 322–25. 
60 A. Cooper Drury and Richard Stuart Olson, “Disasters and Political Unrest: An Empirical 
Investigation,” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 6, no. 3 (1998): 153–61, https://doi.
org/10.1111/1468-5973.00084. 
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international community.61 Drury and Olson’s study primarily examined the impact of 
major disasters on less-developed nations between 1966 and 1980, and the authors 
acknowledge the difficulty in generalizing their findings to well-developed countries.62 
Despite this limitation, their research supports the assumption that disaster severity is a 
major contributing factor to political and social unrest following a disaster. In contrast, 
Robin Hanson examined social collapse after a disaster or other event based on severity 
and resilience on a power curve. His research expanded beyond severity to view the 
linkages between disaster severity and societal capital, which may be natural, physical, 
human, or social.63 He asserts that disasters can unbalance this capital, but social systems 
can be designed to resist damage.64 An online essay from AEON also asserts that 
developing nations may be unwilling to accept foreign aid because of the resulting power 
competition, citing India’s 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and Haiti’s 2010 earthquake 
response.65 If this assumption is correct, developing nations affected by a major disaster 
may have additional challenges in maintaining legitimacy because of scarce internal 
resources and reluctance to accept international resources. The dynamics examined by 
these researchers illustrate that no single element or approach ensures legitimacy; 
governments must tailor their approaches.  
Another body of literature analyzes how the nature of political regimes affects the 
government’s legitimacy during and after disaster response. For example, Choudhury 
found that democracy is not necessarily the most effective government structure for 
disaster response.66 For example, citizens in democratic governments are more likely than 
those in centralized or other government types to openly criticize response efforts. This 
research found that autocracies and some democracies, particularly well-established 
 
61 Drury and Olson, 155. 
62 Drury and Olson, 156. 
63 Robin Hanson, “Catastrophe, Social Collapse, and Human Extinction” (Fairfax, VA: George Mason 
University, 2007), 1–2. 
64 Hanson, 5, 10. 
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democracies, are most likely to respond effectively, but no single government type is more 
resilient than others.67 Carlin, Love, and Zechmeister also examined the role of democracy 
in maintaining legitimacy after a major disaster, this time looking at the case study of the 
2010 Chilean earthquake and tsunami.68 They found that in emerging democracies, the 
government loses legitimacy and citizens become less politically tolerant after the disaster. 
By contrast, Drury et al. did not examine the type of government but reviewed cases that 
might not be easily generalized to developed countries. Some may assume that democracies 
are the most effective form of government and most likely to maintain legitimacy following 
a major natural disaster, primarily through effective leadership by elected officials. 
However, this assumption may not be supported, at least as demonstrated by public 
opinion. Linz also points out that support for individual leaders or parties fluctuates even 
as citizen support for the democratic system remains, further complicating the implications 
of using public opinion to gauge legitimacy.69 The type of government system may impact 
legitimacy, but research on this characteristic is complicated by restrictions on freedom of 
speech. 
Another group of scholars debates the role of leadership in maintaining legitimacy. 
These academics argue that independent of the system of government, leaders play a 
significant role in maintaining legitimacy for governments. Boin et al. describe the role of 
a leader in a democratic society in response to crises through the process of meaning-
making, or providing citizens with information delivered convincingly, which enhances 
credibility.70 They assert that leaders can actively shape the opinion of citizens and 
maintain political power as well as legitimacy, thereby avoiding the fates described by 
Carlin, Love, and Zechmeister.71 A study of the public’s opinion of official responses to 
Hurricane Katrina showed how individuals apportioned blame, which provided indicators 
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of how individual leaders were viewed after this major disaster.72 The effectiveness of 
leaders is an important component in examining the causes of lost legitimacy after a crisis.  
In summary, research has explored how disasters affect legitimacy through the 
governmental crisis response, resilience of the government, and other characteristics such 
as the role of social media. Research on the adversarial effects on governmental legitimacy 
is not readily available; rather, the literature focuses primarily on the mistakes and missteps 
of leaders following a crisis. Some scholars have examined the effectiveness of disaster 
response differentiated by authoritarian regimes and democracies, and further divided into 
established vis-à-vis newly formed democracies. However, these distinguishing 
characteristics are not fixed or widely accepted, which may complicate further research 
into how democratic governments react to major disasters and adversarial attacks. 
B. RESILIENCE CAPACITY 
Governments enable maintenance of legitimacy against the impacts of crises, such 
as disasters, by maintaining resilience. Institutions such as governments are socially 
constructed, so their capacity for resilience is viewed through the lens of individuals or 
communities. March and Olsen establish two frameworks for understanding the social 
construction of political institutions: the rational actor perspective, in which individuals 
create the political system, and the cultural community perspective, in which the political 
system is established through “shared values and world-views” based on “common culture, 
experience, and vision.”73 Christensen and Laegreid further refined the rational actor 
perspective, naming their concepts diffuse support, or trust in the institutions, and specific 
support, or trust in the individuals responsible for these institutions.74 These constructs 
share a similar baseline understanding that government must provide support to its citizens, 
which in turn leads to citizens support of these institutions. Christensen and Laegreid 
describe this understanding as the belief that governments should be providing services 
 
72 Neil Malhotra and Alexander G. Kuo, “Attributing Blame: The Public’s Response to Hurricane 
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18 
and a belief in advancing common interests and goals for the community.75 Through this 
statement, they also reference the cultural community perspective in which common goals 
underpin the political system. 
Resilience of political institutions or systems is the subject of scholarly research 
with trust as a core component. March and Olsen state that government is at its highest 
level of resilience when trust in both political individuals and institutions is high, and when 
these serve to reinforce each other.76 Newton further investigates trust relationships 
through the lens of social and political capital, and relationships between these concepts 
and support for political institutions.77 His research finds that political trust is important—
especially for democracies in which untrustworthy politicians suffer penalties—and 
effective political systems require social capital to build and sustain them, but high levels 
of social capital do not guarantee political capital or support for institutions.78 Linz takes 
a nuanced view, linking legitimacy to democratic political institutions, socioeconomic 
systems, and a fair and adaptable social order.79 
Newton’s examination of social capital, or civic engagement and cooperation 
within a society, resembles March and Olsen’s cultural community and Linz’s social order. 
However, these views differ from descriptions of trust by Christensen and Laegreid and 
the OECD in terms of the rational actor, including the impacts or outcomes for individuals. 
Christensen and Laegreid highlight the benefits that individuals receive from services, 
political and party affiliation, levels of education, and demographics as contributors to trust 
in political institutions.80 The OECD describes trust in the more general terms of individual 
experiences with services and the efficiency and effectiveness of governments.81 They 
specify the main contributors of trust in government as “1) culture; 2) institutional setting; 
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3) economic and social outcomes; and 4) performance of institutions.”82 Common among 
these two definitions are the outcomes that affect the individual, particularly in economic 
benefits and social services. Christensen and Laegreid, however, focus on individual 
characteristics, such as demographics, whereas the OECD focuses on governmental 
process components. Specifically, the OECD describes the processes that citizens expect 
from government: reliability, responsiveness, openness and inclusiveness, integrity, and 
fairness.83  
For this thesis, resilience of political institutions is defined as the intersection of 
vulnerability that exists before an event, the incident’s impacts, and the capacity for 
adapting to the post-event environment. Although the literature outlines the lack of a 
common formula for ensuring the resilience of political institutions, it reveals several 
common themes of trust, culture or community values, and individual benefits as primary 
contributors. The social construct of institutions confirms that citizens, and their views of 
government, are central to the understanding of how governments prepare to endure crises.  
C. EFFECTIVE DISASTER RESPONSE 
This section analyzes the scholarly debates on factors that contribute to effective 
governmental response to disasters or crises. It focuses on the consequences and definition 
of significant incidents and effective application of resources in response to the impacts of 
these events. 
1. Disaster Definition 
With the exception of some homeland security or emergency management–focused 
publications, much of the scholarly research focuses on the concept of a crisis rather than 
a disaster. Boin et al. describe a crisis as follows: 
A social system—a community, an organization, a policy sector, a country, 
or an entire region—experiences an urgent threat to its basic structures or 
fundamental values, which harbors many “unknowns” and appears to 
require a far-reaching response. This definition has three key components 
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which can be illustrated by examining social impacts: threat, urgency, and 
uncertainty.84 
Similarly, a disaster affects the structure and functionality of systems that support 
citizens and directly impacts the health and wellbeing of the population. Perry describes 
the effect of disasters on communities as impacting social interactions and order, causing 
societal functions to depart from the norm.85 Boin et al. agree, describing core and shared 
societal values—such as “safety and security, justice and rule of law, welfare and health, 
integrity and civil liberties”—that, when threatened, influence the perception of the 
situation.86 They write, “The more important the value(s) or structures under threat, the 
deeper the sense of crisis.”87 
With the exception of some classical concepts of a disaster as a natural or 
technological hazard, most researchers consider disasters to be socially constructed crises 
caused by nature, people, or technologies. This broad definition is narrowed by further 
agreement that disasters are rapid or sudden-onset events.88 This distinction separates a 
disaster from other types of humanitarian incidents or conflicts such as war. Carr was 
perhaps the earliest scholar to describe crisis impacts as socially constructed, publishing a 
paper in 1932 that described catastrophic changes as a sequence along a continuum rather 
than a single discrete event.89 With his description of a crisis sequence came a new way of 
describing disaster as social impacts to the community or individual. He categorized this 
change in four ways: “(1) population changes; (2) cultural changes; (3) relational changes; 
and (4) catastrophic changes” (original emphasis).90 In more recent research, Knowles 
agrees: “Behavior in disaster scenarios was socially constructed, contextual, and variable 
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from community to community, while still conforming to discernable and predictable 
patterns.”91 Kathleen Tierney distinguishes between socially constructed hazards and 
disasters and socially produced disasters: 
A focus on social constructionism emphasizes how ideas and assumptions 
about hazards and disasters—and our own understandings—are shaped by 
narratives, discourses, institutional practices, and other factors. By contrast, 
the analysis of the social production of disasters centers on how social 
structures and social processes operate to create the conditions that make 
geological, meteorological, and other physical events disastrous.92 
Despite general agreement among scholars on what constitutes a disaster, no 
consensus emerges on what distinguishes a catastrophic disaster. The Federal Emergency 
Management Agency describes a catastrophic incident from the perspective of the response 
requirements for stabilization, stating that in such an incident, critical resource shortfalls 
will require innovation and the use of atypical capabilities.93 Perry describes a disaster 
magnitude as “measured not in lives or property lost, but by the extent of the failures of the 
normative or cultural system”—further reinforcing the concept of disasters as socially 
constructed and, therefore, difficult to measure through their impact to the environment.94 
Boin et al. view difficult disasters through the lens of uncertainty in the operational 
environment, categorizing these incidents as “unknown unknowns” and highlighting the 
rapid pace of the effects and the general sense of confusion and distrust among the 
citizens.95 In his comprehensive definition, Quarantelli uses both a description of the 
operational environment, or impacts of the disaster, and the response resources required 
when describing the difference between a disaster and a catastrophe. He asserts that 
catastrophic disasters exhibit characteristics that are distinct from widespread or extensive 
disasters, including significant and widespread impacts on structures and emergency 
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response organizations, local responders who are unavailable for typical assistance, and 
challenges to the normal convergence of response resources and other support.96 The final 
characteristics of a catastrophic disaster, according to Quarantelli, involve severely 
hampered social and infrastructural components of the community, increased media 
attention, and the importance of organizational and governmental politics in the response 
and outcomes of the disaster.97 Similarly, Tierney describes the distinctions between 
disasters and catastrophes in terms of “spatial scope, the severity of their impacts, which 
entities respond and how, the degree of public participation in providing assistance, and 
recovery challenges.”98 
A disaster environment is unpredictable, but researchers agree that the impacts on 
the stability and functionality of community or social systems and populations are socially 
constructed and that vulnerability exacerbates the disaster’s impacts on citizens. 
2. Ethical Application of Resources 
Because the residents, history, and vulnerabilities of each community are unique, 
how vulnerabilities will manifest and impact the disaster response—as well as which 
options should be leveraged to alleviate the impact on the community—remains uncertain. 
Additionally, in a catastrophic disaster, the magnitude of the disaster and scarcity of 
resources change the standard of care provided to individuals. Quarantelli describes the 
response to catastrophic disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina:  
Different performance standards are applied. For example, the normal speed 
of response and individualized care given to treating the injured is 
superseded by a need to curtail the level of care given to victims as well as 
spending time, efforts and resources on more equitably distributing the 
many victims in the available medical facilities.99 
 
96 E. L. Quarantelli, “Catastrophes Are Different from Disasters: Some Implications for Crisis 




98 Tierney, Disasters, 5–6. 
99 Quarantelli, “Catastrophes Are Different from Disasters.” 
23 
Just as patients are triaged and treated using crisis standards of care when the 
medical system is strained under patient loads, catastrophic disasters require the application 
of crisis standards to the shelter, feeding, hydration, and other operations in a disaster 
response. Researchers at the Disaster Research Center developed a demand-capability 
model that describes the need for adaptation to the stressors of a disaster because the 
demands outstrip the response capacity.100 Similarly, Tierney emphasizes preparing for 
the unexpected but also relying on a knowledge base, saying that responders should “know 
that they can and should improvise and adapt when the situation calls for it” and that 
responders “see improvisation as arising from previously acquired knowledge.”101 
Adaptation and innovation are essential for responding to unknown disasters or when 
resources are constrained. 
Naomi Zach describes the ethical principles underpinning Western democratic 
concepts as social contract theory, which describes the rights of citizens and their 
relationship to the government.102 She asserts that disasters can cause governmental 
dysfunction but are unlikely to cause the “total and permanent failure of government as we 
know it.”103 Specific to disasters, Zach explores traditional ethical frameworks for disaster 
preparedness, response planning, and the execution of response, concluding that different 
frameworks may be required to support decision-making as response has an element of the 
unknown.104 Foundationally, however, the broad moral principle of doing no harm should 
be applied to both preparedness and response, if possible.105 Exceptions to moral 
principles should be made in advance, not during the disaster response.106 Zach 
emphasizes disaster preparation using ethical precepts and recommends several 
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frameworks for disaster response based on moral traditions to enable the most just 
decisions and outcomes possible during a disaster. Michel Prieur, in writing for the Council 
of Europe, details ethical principles for disasters grounded in the concept of human rights. 
This document asserts that ethics must be considered in decision-making before, during, 
and after a disaster and that ethical decisions may vary based on the time of the disaster or 
on the function being performed.107  
The medical community has established ethical guidelines through crisis standards 
of care, a system built to engender the trust of the community by providing better care to 
more patients, equitably distributing resources, and “maximizing the care delivered to the 
population as a whole under austere circumstances.”108 In this system, the ethical 
allocation of medical resources is linked to the “universal ethical values of fairness, 
transparency, consistency, proportionality, and accountability.”109 Fairness in this context 
does not mean that everyone is treated equally but that the differences in treatment are 
based on relevant factors.110 This system centers on the needs of the community as well 
as equitable allocation of resources, with much left to the discretion of the providers based 
on the circumstances encountered. 
Despite these guiding documents for disaster response, individual ethics complicate 
the application of these principles. Aung et al. caution that survivors of a disaster can be 
guided by ethical principles that differ from those responding to the disaster, especially in 
international disaster response.111 He further states that codes and norms inform all 
professionals, yet all professionals are first humans and follow their own moral 
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standards.112 Paula Gordon establishes three types of individual ethical standards for 
public service: 1) “value-based ethics,” in which individuals serve the greater public good; 
2) “value neutral or relative ethics,” in which individuals rely on process and structure for 
ethical guidance; and 3) “no values,” in which individuals fail to prepare for or address 
crises or other concerns.113 These scholars agree that individual ethics must be considered 
when evaluating the ethics of disaster response organizations. 
The ethical allocation of disaster resources is vital in a catastrophic disaster to 
ensure that capabilities are provided to people in need. Communities are stabilized when 
survivor needs, including those of vulnerable populations, are fulfilled in an equitable 
manner based on just principles. 
3. Resilience and Vulnerability  
Scholars recognize that vulnerable individuals in communities are 
disproportionately impacted by disasters and require additional or concentrated support 
from responding agencies in order to recover. The factors that encompass vulnerability, 
however, vary among the scholars. Most also recognize that resilience and vulnerability 
are closely linked. 
A disaster disrupts normal social processes and functions of a community and is 
influenced or impacted by the social culture, politics, and circumstances of those impacted. 
Knowles recognizes that the effects of disasters are influenced by the “human-shaped 
environment and political culture” of the impact area.114 He goes on to say that stress 
events, such as disasters, amplify and highlight vulnerabilities such as political and 
economic vulnerabilities as well as demographics and social structures.115 Quarantelli 
agrees, referencing Hurricane Katrina in stating that disasters, especially catastrophes, 
bring to the surface “racial, class and ethnic differences that are papered over during routine 
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times.”116 These vulnerabilities, including low socioeconomic status, expose such 
survivors to greater risk than experienced by other groups, as well as challenges in 
obtaining support before, during, and after disasters.117 
Tierney describes vulnerability as “a potential for loss.”118 Scholars relate this 
potential to factors such as income and power, though their descriptions of these concepts 
differ. Perry takes a broad view of vulnerability, defining it as the cause of disruption in 
the social structure, which is closely related to the definition of disasters as impacting social 
functions.119 Tierney and Perry assert that vulnerability to the impacts of disasters is linked 
to income, minority status, and power status.120 For example, higher-income individuals 
have access to safer housing, reducing their risk to disasters.121 Fothergill and Peek focus 
on income and power relationships in examining threat perception, response to disaster 
warnings, and psychological effects following a disaster.122 They find that “poor 
individuals perceive threats as more serious,” linked perhaps to a lack of power over their 
circumstances because of marginalization based on poverty, education, or gender.123 
Although they understand the threats, poor individuals are often less prepared to respond, 
either because of a lack of savings for unexpected expenses or because of language or 
cultural impediments to heeding disaster warnings.124 Additionally, “some groups will be 
less able than others to navigate the recovery process successfully” after a disaster.125 
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However, not all individuals in these groups are vulnerable to disasters, and vulnerability 
varies depending on circumstances. As Tierney points out, “Social vulnerability has 
temporal, spatial, and situational dimensions.”126 
Just as vulnerability is differentiated along the lines of income and power, 
resilience, too, is linked to these statuses and varies from one group to another. Tierney 
and Perry assert that individuals with greater access to resources tend to be more resilient 
in the face of a disaster.127 Moreover, Fothergill and Peek assert that individuals with 
higher incomes can often secure financial and other support after a disaster by navigating 
bureaucratic systems to obtain aid, increasing their post-disaster resilience.128 Generally, 
Tierney states, “resilience involves the ability to cope and adapt when disasters strike and 
to move on to recover” by leveraging adaptive strategies.129 
Vulnerability is not equal among survivors of a disaster, with a greater burden 
shouldered by the poor and disadvantaged. As a result of these systemic issues, enhanced 
support for building pre- and post-disaster resilience within these populations is required. 
D. MISINFORMATION, DISINFORMATION, AND MALINFORMATION 
This section provides an analysis of the emerging scholarship surrounding the 
definition of false information spread over platforms, including traditional media and social 
media; its purpose or intended result; how it is created and disseminated, and how to 
counter and prevent false information from affecting citizens, democracy, and 
governmental or institutional legitimacy.  
1. False or Harmful Information 
Scholars agree that the purpose of spreading false or harmful information is to 
influence and deceive, and its roots stretch beyond the modern environment. Historical 
examples of these concepts include Edward Bernays’s definition of propaganda in his 1928 
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book as influence over the public and private habits of individuals and, therefore, 
societies.130 The manipulators of the public in Bernays’s time were advertisers, but 
perhaps they planted the seeds of today’s social media influencers. Other historical 
examples include the Soviet Union’s active measures, which also aimed to influence public 
opinions on politics through information targeted at the public, as well as other influential 
means such as the media.131 The hearings on this topic distinguished active measures, 
which are covert activities, from “overt policy tools, such as propaganda and 
diplomacy.”132 In this way, propaganda and advertising are set apart from covert activities 
aimed to deceive. Within the military, both overt and covert means are used for deception 
of the enemy. Michael Handel describes the roots of military deception in Sun Tzu and 
Clausewitz, arguing that military deception is necessary for military surprise and in 
magnifying the strength of the powers involved.133 Barton Whaley connects these themes 
in his general theory of deception, in which he identifies types of deception, or the 
“distortion of perceived reality” to influence the individual by causing confusion of the 
senses.134  
Recent scholars have further refined the differences between purposeful influence 
and persuasion with consent, although many highlight the manipulative nature of 
advertising and other similar activities. Cybenko, Giani, and Thompson argue that 
education, propaganda, and advertising are all meant to persuade individuals, but 
individuals know they are being targeted for influence.135 However, Caroline Jack 
concedes in Lexicon of Lies that “in practice, the lines separating advertising, public 
relations, and public diplomacy (terms often regarded as neutral) from the pejorative term 
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propaganda (which usually implies deliberate intent to manipulate or deceive) can be hard 
to discern.”136 These scholars distinguish between persuasion and manipulation but 
recognize there is overlap in these areas. 
Within the broad definition of false information, scholars use several terms to 
describe purposeful manipulation. In their general definition, Starbird, Arif, and Wilson 
define strategic information operations as “efforts by individuals and groups, including 
state and non-state actors, to manipulate public opinion and change how people perceive 
events in the world by intentionally altering the information environment.”137 Similarly, 
the Homeland Security Advisory Council focuses on foreign information activities, which 
it defines as a manipulation of public opinion that serves those who seek to “undermine 
trust in the authenticity of information.”138 Allenby and Garreau’s weaponized narrative 
concept is similar to information operations.139 Manipulation of the narrative is expanded 
on by Wilson, Zhou, and Starbird, who introduce types of narratives used in the 
sensemaking process.140 Cybenko, Giani, and Thompson further expand on the ways in 
which individuals are influenced in the sensemaking process, describing their concept of 
cognitive hacking, which is either “covert, which includes the subtle manipulation of 
perceptions and the blatant use of misleading information, or overt, which includes 
defacing or spoofing legitimate forms of communication to influence the user.”141 
Although there is no consensus yet on the terminology to describe the practice of 
purposeful manipulation of public opinion, these definitions commonly refer to 
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information that is purposefully altered to affect individuals’ perception and societal 
narratives through the sensemaking process, with some specifying goals such as impacting 
trust. 
Two additional definitions focus on the spread of manipulative information over 
electronic systems as a further differentiator. Donovan and Friedberg describe source 
hacking as “a set of techniques for hiding the sources of problematic information in order 
to permit its circulation in mainstream media.”142 In contrast, Oxford focuses on social 
media in its definition of the term computational propaganda, or the use of “algorithms, 
automation, and human curation to purposefully distribute misleading information over 
social media networks.”143 The term dezinformatsiya has been used to describe the Soviet 
Union’s active measures, spreading false or misleading information through traditional 
media.144 Recently, the Chinese term xuanchuan has been used to describe a social media 
strategy in which “coordinated posts don’t spread false information, but instead flood 
conversational spaces with positive messages or attempts to change the subject.”145 These 
terms draw from the language of computer science and online systems as well as from 
international cultures to describe the purposeful manipulation of public opinions. 
Within the academic literature, some consensus is emerging around specific terms 
for the spread of misleading information on traditional or social media. Despite such 
convergence, Caroline Jack points out that definitions overlap, are used inconsistently, and 
are subjective.146 Scholars generally agree that the term “fake news,” although commonly 
used, has political and cultural meanings that are problematic.147 The definition that seems 
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most comprehensive and often used is that of Wardle and Derakhshan, which encompasses 
three types of information disorder: 
Mis-information is when false information is shared, but no harm is meant. 
Dis-information is when false information is knowingly shared to cause 
harm. Mal-information is when genuine information is shared to cause 
harm, often by moving information designed to stay private into the public 
sphere.148  
These definitions are used in this thesis, and hereafter, the terms may be grouped together 
as mis-, dis- and mal-information. 
The intent of the deceiver to cause harm is a common trait identified by scholars as 
the differentiating characteristic between disinformation and other types of deception. Jack 
agrees with Wardle and Derakhshan’s use of intent as a distinguishing characteristic that 
separates “information that is inaccurate, incorrect, or misleading” into categories of 
disinformation and misinformation.149 She goes on to describe misinformation as the 
potential result of a mistake or failure to verify information, sometimes in an attempt to be 
first to report a story.150 Rumors can be described as misinformation as they are often 
spread without intent during the initial sensemaking process. Starbird et al. clarify that 
rumors, though potentially harmful, are developed when authoritative information is not 
available and in “situations characterized by high levels of uncertainty and anxiety.”151 
Rumors are an “attempt to make sense of uncertain situations” and, therefore, are not 
usually spread with intent to cause harm.152 However, their presence in the narrative can 
in fact be damaging. Jack describes disinformation, on the other hand, as “information that 
is deliberately false or misleading.”153 Colley, Granelli, and Althuis agree that although 
the terms disinformation and misinformation both describe false or misleading 
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information, disinformation is spread “intentionally to deceive” while misinformation is 
spread “without the intention to deceive.”154 Jack, along with Colley, Granelli, and 
Althuis, points out that intent is often very difficult to prove.155 Finally, Gabriel and de 
Cock Buning add that disinformation is intentionally produced to “cause public harm or 
for profit.”156 Other researchers also highlight the monetary or profit-making aspects of 
disinformation. 
False information can be delivered with the goal of manipulating and influencing 
individuals or groups through the sensemaking process. Delivery of false information can 
be accomplished overtly or covertly, with or without the intent to deceive. Additionally, 
the projected outcome of information manipulation with intent to deceive can vary from 
manipulating public opinion and perceptions to undermining trust or gaining profit. 
Although there are a number of terms that have been developed to label the modern tactics 
of covert and deliberate manipulation, for this thesis, the term information operations is 
used. 
2. Purpose and Spread of Disinformation and Malinformation 
Disinformation and malinformation are political tools used to achieve strategic 
aims by individuals and nation states. Although the purposes served with these tools vary 
from achieving power to undermining an opponent, these tools should be viewed through 
the lens of strategic goals. They comprise three elements: the creation of content, 
dissemination, and receipt by the individual. Combined, these components allow the tool 
to be effective.  
These tools satisfy the aim of intentionally deceiving individuals in order to achieve 
a strategic objective. They are powerful weapons in the hands of a nation-state or group 
with the capability to target individuals, groups, or even societies to create instability or 
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alter their course. Individuals in an open society are more likely to be vulnerable to this 
manipulation.157 This fact was historically recognized by Lenin and others who saw the 
liberal ideals of freedom of speech and of the press as an opportunity for spreading 
propaganda.158 In current times, Pomerantsev and Weiss describe how Russia exploits the 
modern Western weaknesses of societal divides, systemic weak spots, waning faith in the 
media, fear of harm to one’s self or reputation, and difficulty distinguishing between 
legitimate and state-sponsored activities in current campaigns of disinformation.159 
Additionally, as Handel points out, cognitive biases can reinforce existing ideas, especially 
when they fit preconceptions, or create ambiguity and doubt.160 Biases such as these 
contribute to the effectiveness of these weapons. 
Individual and societal weaknesses are compounded by the rise of social media in 
which platforms comingle different content such as news and entertainment, creating 
ambiguity and opportunity for exploitation of this environment.161 Researchers Bradshaw 
and Howard at Oxford’s Project on Computational Propaganda report evidence of 
propaganda campaigns through social media in 70 countries, an increase from 28 in 2017 
and 48 in 2018.162 These growing numbers could be the result of increased activity or the 
result of better recognition of these campaigns over time.163 The project has found that 
political activity on social media platforms varies between authoritarian regimes and 
democracies, with messaging focused on spreading pro-government or party propaganda 
or attacking opponents, districting people from important issues, suppressing participation 
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through personal attacks, and driving division and polarization.164 Disinformation and 
malinformation are political tools that are widely used to achieve strategic objectives. 
There are many ways in which harmful information is created, some of which are 
based on historical tools developed by the military or propagandists. Whaley described 
techniques of disinformation well before social media was even on the horizon, using 
military deception and psychology to describe the process for planning and gaining 
acceptance of the deception. He describes dazzling, which aims to confuse individuals and 
make them question the truth or reality of a thing or event.165 He also describes decoying, 
which creates an alternate version of an event to distract individuals from the real one.166 
In the same era of pre–social media research, Daniel and Herbig also described the 
technique of using plausible information to confuse an individual and provide convincing 
evidence that an alternate narrative is correct.167 
In the current information environment dominated by social media, these deception 
techniques are similar to those described by Wilson, Zhou, and Starbird in their 
examination of groups advocating for their narrative or attempting to undermine and 
confuse the competing narrative.168 They discovered that groups aim to manipulate 
narratives by “introducing uncertainty into the information space and discrediting 
information providers.”169 These measures, similar to Whaley’s dazzling concept, seek to 
confuse and undermine the public’s ability to make decisions by introducing 
uncertainty.170 They have also learned that groups target information providers through 
personal attacks, often relying on emotional reactions, to target the “credibility of the 
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provider with the aim of diminishing trust and introducing further uncertainty.”171 Finally, 
they have discerned that groups seek to undermine the narrative, also known as creating an 
anti-narrative, or replace it with a counter-narrative.172 Such a motive is similar to the 
techniques described by Whaley as well as Daniel and Herbig.  
The research converges on methods for perpetrating information operations, though 
specific techniques vary greatly. Some examples include “astroturfing,” “viral 
sloganeering,” and “keyword squatting.” According to Bradshaw and Howard, although 
the naming conventions vary, the techniques fall into common categories of activities—
“(1) the creation of disinformation or manipulated media; (2) mass-reporting of content or 
accounts; (3) data-driven strategies; (4) trolling, doxing or harassment; (5) amplifying 
content and media online”—with disinformation being the most widely used tool.173 
Caroline Jack adds another, describing the tactics of flooding conversational spaces as a 
means to “steer public discourse as effectively as confrontation or debate or, conversely, 
lead dissenting members of the public to retreat from a discussion that they perceive to 
have become an echo chamber.”174  
Once created, content must be spread widely to be effective at achieving strategic 
goals. Several researchers highlight the role of storytelling in the spread of information, 
arguing that stories are an important part of how humans communicate and create a shared 
narrative. Walter Fisher, referring to the use of narrative in his research, suggests that 
humans convey and understand ideas and values through storytelling.175 Wardle and 
Derakhshan point out that news consumption, once a collective or community experience, 
is now an individual process but one that is visible to the community through social 
 
171 Wilson, Zhou, and Starbird, 18, 21. 
172 Wilson, Zhou, and Starbird, 22. 
173 Bradshaw and Howard, The Global Disinformation Order, 15. 
174 Jack, Lexicon of Lies, 9. 
175 Walter R. Fisher, Human Communication as Narration: Toward a Philosophy of Reason, Value 
and Action (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989). 
36 
media.176 In this way, the individual is simultaneously both part of and separate from the 
collective sensemaking process.  
Content is also spread through systems that can be either organized or 
decentralized. Starbird, Arif, and Wilson describe the systems by which information is 
organized and spread after a crisis through the sensemaking process. Information 
operations online comprise individuals who are either organized or decentralized but create 
the same effect of sharing false information online.177 The researchers separated the 
participatory actions of individuals online into three categories: an orchestrated or 
centralized approach, a coordinated approach in which a community may have some 
coordination, and an emergency or organic community that organizes around users that 
share a similar narrative.178 These communities organize and spread information, 
including disinformation, online after a crisis. Bradshaw and Howard focus only on the 
orchestrated or centralized organization, describing the motivations and professions of 
individuals in these networks. They include paid government employees, usually in the 
military or government administrations; political parties or candidates; temporary private 
contractors; volunteers collaborating with governments, who may be rewarded for their 
work; or paid influencers or others who can reach citizens on social media.179 
Researchers have uncovered a number of specific tools and methods used to 
distribute and disseminate disinformation through social media systems. Within the last 
few years, the conversation has focused at times on social media bots—or software 
designed to communicate realistically with users and other social bots in a network—and 
tools to detect and combat social bots that are reducing their effectiveness.180 Recently, 
researchers have identified the increased role of humans in communication manipulation 
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on social media. Bradshaw and Howard’s research showed that most of the countries 
studied are using humans to spread disinformation, with some using bots or a blend of the 
two in a “cyborg.”181 Some nations that spread disinformation hack accounts or use real 
accounts; the use of real accounts may become more common as social media companies 
root out bots and other fake accounts.182 Bayer et al. also describe methods to amplify 
messages on social media through artificial intelligence and paid human “trolls.”183  
Last, traditional media and social media platforms play an important role in the 
dissemination of information. Although Facebook is currently the largest social media 
platform for political communication, Instagram, YouTube, and WhatsApp may grow in 
the future.184 Researchers seem to focus on Twitter, perhaps because it is easy to study, 
but Bayer et al. point out that Snapchat is more popular than Facebook among younger 
users.185 Wardle and Derakhshan also assert that the distribution of disinformation may be 
changing to platforms such as WhatsApp or WeChat, which are hidden from the view of 
regulators and researchers.186 They also point out that the information ecosystem is larger 
than just social media; modes such as “partisan radio, television and social media; 
exaggerated emotional articulations of the world; [and] quick delivery via algorithmically 
derived feeds on smartphones and audiences that skim headlines to cope with the floods of 
information” must also be considered in the context of understanding misinformation and 
disinformation.187 Taken together, the spread of information by social media and other 
methods can reinforce individual beliefs, promoting confirmation bias, and distract from 
truthful content. 
As a result of the 2016 U.S. elections and other recent events, Russian tactics for 
creating and disseminating disinformation and malinformation are now recognized 
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internationally. Russia manipulates the narrative by leveraging the free flow of information 
in societies as well as on social media. Pomerantsev and Weiss describe Russia’s efforts to 
exacerbate societal divides by supporting extreme groups—regardless of whether their 
philosophies align with Russia’s—through state-sponsored and well-funded media 
operations.188 Paul and Matthews, researchers at RAND, agree, describing Russian 
techniques for sowing confusion, such as spreading propaganda through a deluge of 
messages, tools, and channels, and its willingness to spread lies or partial truths through a 
lack of integrity, inconsistency, and “rapid, continuous, and repetitive” messages.189 They 
go on to describe Russia’s success through direct influence by adding confusion to the 
information environment and preventing truthful information from reaching 
individuals.190  
In order for disinformation to be effective, it must be received by individuals or 
groups and influence their beliefs or behavior. In addition to well-developed tools for 
spreading deceptive information, Russia also leverages psychology to achieve its strategic 
objectives. This includes the tendency of individuals to believe information endorsed by 
others, which Russia leverages to lend credibility to its disruptive information through a 
high number of endorsements in social media or existing networks or credible sources to 
spread information.191 Using another tool from psychology, Russia is quick to interpret 
events—which might be rooted in truth or entirely fiction—that support its narrative or 
goals because individuals tend to believe the first information they receive on a topic.192 
Repetition is then used to reinforce this information, leading to acceptance.193 Paul and 
Matthews assert that Russia is able to dominate the narrative and succeed in spreading 
disinformation through the combined forces of individual information overload, the 
tendency of individuals to forget the source of information and not to fact-check, individual 
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confirmation bias, and the agility of Russian propagandists to disseminate information 
quickly through multiple channels.194 They also describe how narratives are spread 
through “stories or accounts that create emotional arousal in the recipient (e.g., disgust, 
fear, happiness).”195 Russia has been successful in perpetrating information operations by 
leveraging psychology and quickly and repeatedly providing a disinformation narrative to 
individuals. 
Other researchers, not focusing on Russia, have found that similar factors have been 
observed in the reception and processing of information. In examining the use of social 
media as part of the social process of collective sensemaking after an emergency, Arif et 
al. found that three factors influenced the spread of rumors or misinformation: volume, or 
how prevalent the information was in social media; initial potential exposure or follower 
count of those sharing the information; and derivative content, or close but not exact copies 
of the original information.196 Arif et al. built this theory on previous works by Starbird et 
al. and Spiro et al. on understanding rumor dynamics, focused mainly on the volume of 
information shared to understand its influence.197  
Scholars have debated the role of “echo chambers” in media and social media in 
the reception process that shapes individual beliefs. Bayer et al. describe the role of 
artificial intelligence and micro-targeting in driving confirmation bias and creating 
“bubbles” and “echo chambers” in social networks.198 Wardle and Derakhshan, however, 
find that the effect of echo chambers is inconclusive.199 Tucker et al. agree, saying that 
there is “no scholarly consensus about whether ‘echo chambers’ lead to polarization.”200 
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The more commonly agreed-upon factor in shaping beliefs is emotion. Wardle and 
Derakhshan suggest that both the use of feelings, such as fear or anger, and the emotional 
response to offenses by trolls affect the way that individuals engage with the conversations 
online.201 Similarly, Tucker et al. define trolls as those who seek an emotional response, 
stating that anxiety and anger are tools for spreading disinformation on platforms.202 
False information spreads both because of technology and because of the social 
structures and emotional reactions to content. Starbird, Arif, and Wilson describe this 
dynamic as the “mutual shaping of the technological platforms, social structures, and 
human behavior.”203 Social structures and the norms that guide online communities, 
including the process of receiving false information, must be accounted for in the 
conversation on how this information is created and spread online and, in turn, on how to 
counter it. 
3. Countering Misinformation, Disinformation, and Malinformation 
Scholars have focused recommendations for countering harmful online information 
on the dissemination and reception processes. Countering false narratives is typically 
described as a function of changing the type of information available online or changing 
individuals’ behaviors when they view information. Both of these strategies present 
significant challenges in effecting behavioral modifications and as a consequence of the 
value of freedoms of speech in democratic societies.  
The first solution identified by many scholars is to detect and limit disinformation 
spread on media and social media platforms. Cybenko, Giani, and Thompson describe this 
method as “preventing unauthorized access to information assets (to counter defacements 
or spoofing) or detecting posted misinformation before it affects user behavior (possibly 
after dissemination).”204 Paul and Matthews refine this approach by prioritizing counter-
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propaganda efforts based on the objective.205 Starbird, Arif, and Wilson point out that 
social media companies are reluctant to become censors and distinguish truth from fiction 
on their platforms, so they are more focused on the task of identifying fake accounts.206 
As stated previously, because fake accounts are less prevalent, targeting them is a less-
effective preventative measure. Starbird, Arif, and Wilson suggest that an alternative 
option is for social media platforms to review the sincerity of the posts or information 
shared rather than judging whether they are true.207 Such a focus might have potential 
negative side effects, however, as it may conflict with values of freedom of speech and the 
goal of the platform to serve as an online community space.208 Additionally, Fredheim and 
Bay have found that social media platforms, despite commitments to prevent abuse, are 
unable to counter malicious use.209 They claim, “Self-regulation is not working. The 
manipulation industry is growing year by year. We see no sign that it is becoming 
substantially more expensive or more difficult to conduct widespread social media 
manipulation.”210 
Hunt, Agarwal, and Zhuang suggest that machine learning can be used to identify 
false information, yet Ferrara et al. maintain that crowdsourcing is a more accurate 
option.211 Pomerantsev and Weiss recommend the development of an international system 
that analyzes and rates disinformation, an international standard of acceptable and 
unacceptable behavior, individuals who focus on disinformation as “counter propaganda 
editors,” and a way to hold state-sponsored supporters of disinformation accountable.212 
Paul and Matthews take these ideas a step further, suggesting that Russian propaganda 
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sources and goals be publicized and that regulators sanction media, such as Russia Today, 
that disseminates disinformation in an effort to slow its spread.213 Donovan and Friedberg 
agree, suggesting that social media platforms should label disinformation and provide 
metadata for accounts.214 However, Paul West of the Brookings Institute disagrees, fearing 
that media or individuals will self-censor posts if platforms are made liable for presenting 
misinformation.215 He suggests instead that a combination of strong news media, tools to 
identify false information, reduced financial incentives for disinformation, and customers 
who are exposed to a variety of facts and opinions and who question the news sources and 
content can stop the flow of misinformation and disinformation.216 Focusing on the 
COVID-19 pandemic, Eliška Pírková agrees with West, suggesting that transparency, 
protection of journalistic integrity, and safeguarding of those who speak up are more 
effective ways to counter misinformation and ensure public access to freedom of 
information than criminal penalties or actions by online platforms.217 
The second solution is to help consumers of information—with a focus on key 
sectors of the public—discern between disinformation and truth, understand the harm of 
disinformation, and reduce the flow of false information. Bayer et al. argue for educating 
citizens in civics and increasing their media literacy.218 Jack argues that media literacy is 
needed but insufficient to counteract the confusion.219 She joins Bayer et al. in advocating 
for fact-checking sites as another helpful resource.220 Bayer et al. also suggest increased 
transparency efforts, from clearly marking advertisements, sources, and influencers on 
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social media to requiring platforms to promote diverse content and ideas.221 Paul and 
Matthews suggest increasing the flow of information to counter disinformation, saying, 
“Compete! If Russian propaganda aims to achieve certain effects, it can be countered by 
preventing or diminishing those effects.”222 Colley, Granelli, and Althuis go further with 
this idea, advocating a sociological approach to a specific event or issue that includes all 
forms of information flow throughout social networks, both online and off.223 Such an 
approach requires an understanding of the issues, social networks, trusted information 
sources within networks, and tensions to grasp how disinformation or misinformation 
affects the social networks and exacerbates tensions and how to apply countermeasures.224 
The Department of Homeland Security’s Social Media Working Group for Emergency 
Services and Disaster Management advocates quickly releasing information, countering 
rumors online, and using crowdsourcing to obtain situational awareness and monitor and 
dispel rumors.225 Pomerantsev and Weiss, in their focus on Russia, also suggest providing 
additional support to vulnerable populations such as those in the Baltics.226  
In addition to the specific solutions identified, Bodine-Baron et al. argue for 
collaboration and cooperation between public and private groups for research and policy 
development, as well as between government, social media, and media platforms, with 
support from academia.227 Similarly, Robinson et al. recommend collaboration between 
civilian and military representatives at home and abroad through an exchange of personnel 
(including planners), plans, information and intelligence, and knowledge to defend against 
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what they term political warfare, which includes disinformation as a tactic.228 They also 
argue for sanctions against the Russian government to limit its ability to support 
disinformation campaigns directly or through proxies.229 
Counter-disinformation campaigns focus on disrupting either the dissemination or 
reception components. Such disruption can be accomplished by preventing access to 
information that could become harmful, increasing transparency, developing a standard, 
international rating system for information sincerity or other objectives, and increasing 
media literacy and the understanding of civics. Additionally, scholars assert that 
cooperation of the government, private sector, and academia is important for countering 
harmful information using these or other techniques. 
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III. CASE STUDIES OF DISASTERS AND FALSE INFORMATION 
EFFECTS ON DEMOCRACY 
Democratic institutions are affected by complex disasters, the vulnerability and 
resilience of the population, and the quality of the response, as well as the influences of 
false information on these elements. Vulnerability is defined as the “potential for loss” and 
resilience the “ability to cope and adapt.”230 While catastrophic disasters have historically 
disrupted the ecosystems of civil society and the government, the recent rise and spread of 
false information within the media ecosystem after such disasters has threatened to 
undermine trust in democratic social, economic, and political institutions. These forces—
disasters and mis-, dis-, and mal-information—encompass emotions, social constructs, the 
imbalance of power among vulnerable populations, and uneven individual and community 
resilience to expose the weaknesses in social values and the principles of democratic 
governments. 
This chapter presents a comparative examination of the effects of several 
disasters—the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear power plant disaster in 
Japan; the Australian wildfires of 2019–2020; and the ongoing COVID-19 response in the 
United States that began in 2020—and false information on the citizens and societies of 
these nations. It also analyzes the effects of these disasters and mis-, dis-, and mal-
information on the legitimacy of the social, economic, and political institutions of a 
democracy. 
A. JAPAN: EARTHQUAKE, TSUNAMI, AND NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 
DISASTER 
On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake occurred in the ocean near the 
Tōhoku region of Japan; it was one of the most powerful earthquakes recorded and the 
most significant in Japanese records.231 A massive tsunami followed the earthquake, 
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wiping clean an area as far inland as 5 km.232 Three reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear power plant experienced meltdowns and spread radioactive contamination.233 This 
disaster complex is also known simply as 3/11. 
This disaster affected all aspects of Japanese society. An enormous number of 
people were killed; 15,760 people died, 5,927 were injured, and 4,282 people were still 
missing as of August 2011.234 The country also absorbed 580,000 displaced people from 
communities destroyed by the earthquake and tsunami.235 Following the nuclear disaster, 
an additional 80,000 people were displaced from within the 20 km radius of the Fukushima 
Daiichi plant; over three months later, 90,000 people remained living in evacuation 
centers.236  
The disaster also affected a wide variety of infrastructure, which hampered 
response efforts and led to cascading effects on supply chains. For example, 4.4 million 
households lost electricity, and 1.5 million lost access to water from damaged 
infrastructure.237 In total, Japan saw 120,000 buildings destroyed and 220,000 damaged, 
and transportation damages interrupted travel from ports, railways, and airports. As a 
result, disaster services and supplies could not move into the affected area, slowing critical 
response to those affected by the disaster.238 Disaster response requirements, infrastructure 
damages, and business interruptions contributed to the cost of the disaster, “estimated 
between $210–300 billion, making it the most expensive natural disaster on record.”239  
In Japan, some citizens had been vulnerable before the disaster because of their age 
and socioeconomic status. For example, a high proportion of elderly individuals lived in 
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coastal villages, so 30 percent of those in the tsunami’s impact area and two-thirds of the 
recovered deceased were 65 or older.240 Additionally, the socioeconomics of the tsunami-
impacted area was mostly rural and agricultural and largely poor, ranking in the bottom 
quarter of per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in Japan.241  
Despite having an identified lead agency for crisis management in Japan, several 
aspects of an effective emergency management system were missing from the response, 
such as a national disaster response plan and limited resources, including coordinating 
staff.242 Prime Minister Kam also instituted political, rather than civil servant, leadership 
for managing the disaster response.243 Immediately after the disaster, a Crisis Management 
Center and Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters were established to coordinate the 
disaster response.244 However, critics point out that while additional groups and task forces 
were established, roles and responsibilities were not clarified, leading to confusion.245  
Volunteers and civic groups as well as the private sector supported the 
government’s emergency response. For example, neighborhood associations—volunteer 
civil society organizations—helped to build critical communication pathways between 
residents and local governments and supported the vulnerable until government assistance 
was available.246 Volunteers, community groups, and civil society organizations were well 
organized and effective in supporting disaster survivors by accessing funding and 
cooperating with each other and governmental and quasi-governmental organizations.247 
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These well-structured organizations leveraged professional non-governmental and other 
organizations, minimizing the emergence effect of unaffiliated volunteers who often 
hamper disaster responses.248 Responding volunteers and organizations used social 
networks to identify requirements and mobilize support in the aftermath of the disaster.249 
Finally, the private sector also helped to augment the government response by providing 
significant disaster relief.250  
Despite the devastating effects of this disaster, the government and community 
response was as effective as possible. Kingston asserts,  
Tsunami disaster relief was reasonably fast and effective under difficult 
circumstances and the evacuees received basic needs. Certainly they had 
reasons to be frustrated with the pace of relief and recovery, but it is hard to 
imagine any government performing better given the devastation of ports 
and other infrastructure and the sheer scale of the disaster.251  
However, the Japanese government did not effectively provision all disaster resources. For 
example, the government’s evacuee lottery system appeared to be fair but had the 
undesirable effect of separating close neighbors and friends, which was detrimental to 
mental health, especially for elderly individuals.252 
1. Disinformation, Misinformation, and Malinformation Effects 
This disaster was one of the first in which communication over social media was 
significant, both for the survivors and for those outside the impacted area seeking to 
understand the consequences.253 For example, responders used social media to locate 
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individuals and connect donations and volunteers with those in need.254 The public also 
recognized this form of communication as a more expedient method of understanding the 
situation and finding support than traditional media or the government, and individuals also 
used social media to communicate with many people simultaneously.255 Disaster survivors 
and others also conveyed emotions through social media; the majority of these posts on 
Twitter referenced the disaster at Fukushima.256 Furthermore, individuals on social media 
were 10 times more likely to use words that evoked a negative response than a positive 
one.257 
Despite the benefits of social media to response efforts, it also helped to spread 
disinformation during the disaster response. The utility responsible for the Fukushima 
Daiichi power plant, the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), spread disinformation 
about Prime Minister Kan, saying that he was responsible for delays in the response to the 
Fukushima reactors that resulted in the hydrogen explosions.258 Ultimately, researchers 
asserted that TEPCO, not the prime minister, bore the primary responsibility for the disaster 
at the Fukushima Daiichi plant.259  
Moreover, rumors or misinformation spread on social media following the disaster. 
Initially, TEPCO failed to reveal the severity of the crisis at Fukushima Daiichi and the 
meltdown there until May 24, more than two and a half months later.260 This failure to 
relay the circumstances about the nuclear crisis led to public anger at the company and the 
government, with three-quarters of survey respondents saying that communication was 
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“unsatisfactory.”261 An additional example of misinformation included that of “cosmo 
oil,” a false rumor that toxic substances would spread via rainfall after the earthquake 
caused an oil refinery to catch fire.262 These instances of misinformation exacerbated 
public concerns and fear caused by the spread of nuclear contamination from the nuclear 
power plant meltdown. 
The spread of misinformation and of disinformation in this disaster decreased the 
credibility of TEPCO and national political leadership. It also caused confusion and anger 
within the public and resulted in citizens’ sharing negative sentiments much more 
frequently than positive sentiments on social media platforms. These effects of false 
information erode trust in political structures and undermine civil society, which are both 
essential components of democratic stability. 
2. Social, Economic, and Political Effects on Democracy 
Social networks were critical in providing disaster support; however, survivor 
displacement and relocation undermined the success of long-term recovery and these 
networks. For example, social cohesion and capital built before the disaster helped to save 
lives immediately after the disaster and aided communities in recovering from the 
disaster.263 The survivors of the disaster were admired for their patience, perseverance, 
and commitment to rebuilding their communities, leveraging their underlying social 
connections.264 Despite this initial cohesion, indicators show that survivors have 
experienced diminished social cohesion following the disaster vis-à-vis other parts of 
Japan.265 As described by Tilly, changes in the strength of processes such as connections 
between citizens through trust networks can affect the stability of democracies, and the 
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reduced social cohesion and consultation in these affected communities may degrade local 
or even national democratic functions.266  
While economic challenges can lead to democratic decline, and this disaster 
significantly damaged Japan’s economy—as it was the most expensive natural disaster on 
record, global supply chains were disrupted, and businesses experienced economic losses 
as well as declines in consumer confidence—it did not result in democratic decline.267 To 
be sure, Japan’s economy shrank following the disaster from a combination of slowed 
trade, unemployment, and infrastructure damages.268 However, Japan’s GDP rebounded, 
rising steadily in the years following 2011.269 While the long-term worsening of economic 
inequality could portend democratic instability, the rebound of Japan’s GDP—despite the 
expense and economic interruptions of this disaster—is a good indicator that democratic 
decline may not follow. 
Political institutions in Japan maintained legitimacy, as demonstrated through 
citizen support and attentiveness. However, Kingston asserts that the government and 
utility (i.e., TEPCO) response to the nuclear disaster was poorly managed, and concerns 
about the long-term health effects of the meltdown have eroded public trust.270 As a result, 
trust in political institutions dropped following the disaster, as did confidence in the 
national government. Shun et al. surveyed residents on their confidence in government and 
public officials, resulting in an assessment that confidence was higher in local governments 
and public officials than in the national government and officials.271 The survey showed 
that “one-quarter of the respondents assessed the national government and public officials 
as reliable or moderately reliable, and half of the respondents assessed the local 
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governments and public officials similarly.”272 Edelman’s Trust Barometer shows that 
following the disaster, trust in government and non-governmental organizations dropped 
more than 20 points.273 Trust in political institutions is necessary for a functioning 
democracy; in Japan, this trust is slowly recovering. 
In this connection, following the disaster, trust in and support of national 
government leadership remained low while local responders were seen favorably. When 
Shun et al. surveyed residents in the impacted areas, they found that 
the evaluation of politicians, such as the prime minister and Diet members, 
was relatively unfavorable, with only about one quarter of the respondents 
rating their performance as high or average. In contrast, the evaluation of 
crisis management entities such as the police, fire authorities, and Self-
Defense Forces was extremely high, demonstrating that the actors most 
closely involved with the residents were viewed very favorably.274 
Before the disaster, Prime Minister Kan was also polling low in public opinion, and his 
administration was beset with scandals.275 Public support for Prime Minister Kan 
remained low in the months following the disaster, with 70 percent of citizens disapproving 
of his leadership and seeking his resignation.276 Samuels describes the critiques of Kan’s 
leadership as offering inconsistent and sometimes contradictory examples of what should 
have been done or said.277 Samuels also asserts, “Within a month, more than three-quarters 
of the public reported that Kan was ‘not exercising leadership.’”278 For example, Kingston 
asserts that the public viewed Kan as displaying “ineffectual leadership skills and inability 
to formulate coherent policies and means to achieve them.”279 He also asserts that Kan 
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“failed to articulate a vision that would give the people of Tōhoku hope for the future.”280 
The National Diet—Japan’s bicameral legislature—held a vote of no confidence in June 
2011, and although Prime Minister Kan did not leave office at the time, he agreed to leave 
office in August that year with conditions for reconstruction funding and renewable energy 
exploration.281 Citizens of democracies expect that elected political leadership will assess 
the situation and deliver policies and resources to help those affected by a disaster recover, 
but Japanese citizens generally viewed Prime Minister Kan as incapable of delivering these 
essential functions. 
This disaster influenced both national and local politics. National political divides 
existed before the disaster and remained following it, with the two major parties arguing 
along party lines to undermine each other.282 Many of those affected by the disaster viewed 
the central government and politicians as ineffective, overly focused on partisan politics, 
and slow to respond to the crisis.283 Local politics, on the other hand, integrated new 
leadership, the private sector, and individual volunteers following the disaster.284 Local 
politicians viewed the national response as ineffective; as a result, they strengthened local 
response capabilities.285 However, this increase in local emergency response capacity was 
complicated by the national government’s consolidation of municipalities nearly a decade 
before the disaster, which created new local administrations that upended the traditional 
village dynamics and left citizens reporting distrust of their leaders.286 Local 
municipalities, building on mutual support, ultimately enhanced their autonomy in Japan’s 
political system.287 Japan’s representative democracy is supported by the authority of the 
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state to perform essential functions; following this disaster, the balance of power within 
the levels of government in Japan shifted toward stronger local authorities.  
3. Conclusions 
This complex and “cascading disaster,” including the initial earthquake, tsunami, 
and finally the nuclear power plant disaster at Fukushima Daiichi, affected all aspects of 
civil society in Japan through the death and displacement of its citizens and fear of health 
ramifications from the meltdown. Additionally, the loss of electricity and communications 
following the earthquake slowed the flow of information, delaying the transmission of 
emergency messaging to the citizens about to be affected by the tsunami and hampering 
evacuation efforts.288 Other infrastructure, such as transportation, was also damaged and 
delayed the response efforts. Although the whole-community response had insufficient 
resources to support the survivors of Japan’s earthquake and tsunami, the initial relief 
efforts were well coordinated and as effective as possible given the circumstances. The use 
of social media, a new capability in this disaster, contributed to the spread of 
misinformation and disinformation, which caused confusion and damaged political 
reputations. The 3/11 disaster presented an enormous challenge to the whole community 
in implementing an effective response and will be remembered as one of the most 
significant disasters in recent history. 
The complexity and magnitude of the disaster, combined with the vulnerable older 
and lower-socioeconomic populations of the affected region, damaged the social and 
economic components of Japan’s democracy. Disinformation and misinformation affected 
the political component of democracy by further undermining support of the prime 
minister, causing confusion and anger, and destabilizing trust and leadership credibility 
among the citizens. Trust in Japan’s national government and leaders was low before the 
disaster and remained low following it, despite a relatively effective whole-of-community 
response in light of the infrastructure damages and communication challenges. Trust in 
local governments intensified, and these entities expanded their authority. Despite the 
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erosion of trust in the national Japanese government caused by the disaster combined with 
misinformation and disinformation, the government retained legitimacy.  
As such, democracy survived. Both the Freedom House and the Economist’s 
Intelligence Unit rate Japan’s democracy as high. In its 2020 Freedom in the World report, 
Freedom House describes Japan as free based on its political rights and civil liberties.289 
Similarly, the Economist upgraded Japan to a full democracy in 2020 based on its electoral 
process, governmental and political functionality, and civil liberties.290 These independent 
analyses demonstrate that Japan’s democracy is fully functioning and that it did not sustain 
significant or lasting damage following the 3/11 disaster.  
B. AUSTRALIA: 2019–2020 WILDFIRES 
The summer wildfire, or bushfire, season of 2019–2020 in Australia may be a 
harbinger of future disasters as citizens and property relocate to disaster-prone areas, and 
those living in these zones are unprepared for and lack a true perception of the risks.291 
This disaster, also known as the “black summer,” was the most significant disaster of its 
kind in Australia in the last 20 years.292 It started in July 2019 and continued through early 
2020, when rainfall finally extinguished the fires.293 The season followed the driest and 
hottest year on record and drought conditions that had lasted for several years.294  
Although only a few people died in this disaster, the damage to the ecology and 
communities in the impact area was extensive. These wildfires burned between 24 and 40 
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million hectares of land, displaced hundreds of communities, and destroyed over 3,000 
homes along with other buildings.295 To illustrate, the amount of land destroyed was 
roughly equal to the size of the country of Japan. The bushfires also killed or displaced an 
estimated three billion animals, destroying large swaths of ecological habitat and 
irreparably damaging the populations of threatened and endangered species.296 
Communities in the affected area experienced economic impacts as a result of the disaster, 
which included losses due to destroyed property, loss of income from tourism and natural 
resources, and healthcare costs associated with the fire including respiratory illnesses.297 
In addition, local farmers lost livestock and timber, adding to the economic effects.298 
Estimates put the total cost at $20–$40 billion including direct and economic losses.299 
Despite the widespread damage, fortunately, only 33 people died.300 However, smoke 
inhalation may have contributed to an estimated 417 additional deaths and thousands of 
hospitalizations.301  
Communication challenges and widespread degradation of air quality contributed 
to the complexity of this disaster. For instance, information-sharing systems in Australia 
are unique to the jurisdiction and seldom compatible, comparable, or interoperable.302 
Additionally, the fires degraded air quality throughout the affected region and into adjacent 
populated areas, such as Sydney, which experienced “81 days of poor or hazardous air 
quality in 2019,” and Canberra, which had particulate concentrations “four-times higher 
than the World Health Organization guidelines.”303 
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Indigenous people were particularly vulnerable before the bushfires began. A 
significant number of indigenous people lived in the area affected by these bushfires; 
however, they represented a minority of the overall population, or about 5.4 percent of the 
people living near the fires.304 In addition, a large proportion of the indigenous people 
were children, leading to concerns about long-term health effects on these populations.305 
Indigenous populations, including Australian Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, 
have historically experienced racism, which increased their vulnerability.306  
The disaster response authorities held by the Commonwealth of Australian during 
national emergencies are unclear, as are general disaster roles and responsibilities.307 
Additionally, the current Australian disaster management arrangements are challenged in 
national disasters; as they lack a method to involve the prime minister or others in national 
leadership positions, the coordination of strategic sharing and placement of resources can 
be problematic.308 As a result, the Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster 
Arrangements recommends that the national government “overhaul” the national 
arrangements for disaster coordination and management with a focus on decision-making 
authorities, involvement of elected officials, and a “robust and accountable national 
coordination mechanism.”309 In this disaster, the Australian government’s emergency 
management agency coordinated response and recovery efforts.310 In addition, the 
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National Aerial Firefighting Centre, under the Australasian Fire and Emergency Service 
Authorities Council, coordinated resource-sharing for this wildfire.311 
The unpredictability of the wildfires and personnel and equipment shortfalls 
hindered the response to this disaster. Moreover, Australian government reports pointed 
out that “bushfire behaviour has become more extreme and less predictable.”312 Many of 
the emergency responders that supported the response to these fires were volunteers 
operating under varying standards and levels of training—and not protected by legal 
immunity or compensated for lost wages.313 Ultimately, the government provided some 
pay and support to volunteer firefighters during the disaster, but immunities and 
employment protections are under consideration.314 Australian military forces also 
supported the response; however, the national government did not activate military support 
until January 2020, well after the catastrophic effects of the disaster were known.315 In 
addition, international governments delivered monetary support and deployed firefighters 
and aircraft to support the Australian response to the wildfires.316  
The scarce firefighting resources appear to have been distributed equitably. Prime 
Minister Morrison established the National Bushfire Recovery Agency in January 2020 to 
support the recovery from this disaster and distribute $2 billion in funds and other support 
for planning community engagement.317 However, the national government provided 
disparate support across jurisdictions for enabling recovery and returning to normal 
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functions, including “variability in the level of collaboration and coordination in the 
delivery of recovery programs and services.”318 
1. Disinformation, Misinformation, and Malinformation Effects 
Much of the conversation on media and social media platforms about this disaster 
related to climate change; 49 percent of media articles about the fires focused on this 
topic.319 Additionally, researchers Tahnee Burgess et al. reveal that “in rank order, the 
most common narratives in the coverage of Black Summer were: triumph of humanity 
(18%), unstoppable power of nature (17%), loss of biodiversity (12%), health and fires 
(11%) and failure of planning (10%).”320  
Both misinformation and disinformation spread on social media platforms 
following the disaster. For example, a widely shared satellite photo described as depicting 
this disaster was actually the cumulative effect of bushfires over the course of about a 
year.321 Other misinformation photos showed red-tinted clouds that users claimed 
represented the fires through the cloud cover and an image portraying a family sheltering 
from the wildfire, which was later attributed to a Tasmanian family in 2013.322 
Additionally, several instances of misinformation included statements that reflected 
climate denialism, including dismissals of the science demonstrating changes in the earth’s 
climate or human activities as the source of these changes. Approximately 5 percent of the 
news that examined climate change reflected denialism statements.323 Some of these 
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narratives included assertions that climate change is not real or that experts are unreliable, 
that Australians are not to blame, that the consequences are not significant, or that the future 
outlook is bleak.324 Similarly, disinformation examples described climate protesters as out 
of control. Researchers Tahnee Burgess et al. have described this messaging as follows: 
This narrative negatively represents protests and frames climate change as 
a highly politicised issue predominantly supported by inner-city protestors. 
This narrative focused on the actions of those in cities and framed their 
actions as selfish, hysterical, inconsiderate or illegal. The narrative 
represents the actions of protestors as disproportionate and proposes an 
agenda for them that is unrelatable to the reader.325  
Researchers Derek Weber et al. also found the following disinformation circulating 
via Twitter:  
• The bushfires were caused by arson; 
• preventative backburning efforts were reduced due to green activism; 
• Australia commonly experiences such bushfires; and 
• climate change is not related to bushfires.326 
Other members of the Twitter community countered this disinformation by leveraging 
social media.327 Nevertheless, research shows that both social bots and trolls amplified the 
tag #ArsonEmergency to spread messages of disinformation about arson causing the 
fires.328 While the goal of these disinformation campaigns is unclear, presumably, they 
aimed to cause confusion, conflict, and polarization.329 
Both misinformation and disinformation ultimately contributed to civil unrest, 
including demonstrations against the government’s policies and actions related to climate 
change. It further divided the public and political views on the severity of climate change, 
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a volatile topic, and exacerbated polarization, which could undermine a democratic 
government. 
2. Social, Economic, and Political Effects on Democracy 
This disaster negatively affected the social and economic institutions of Australia. 
Lasting mental health issues resulted from the combination of the drought, followed by 
bushfires, followed by the COVID-19 pandemic.330 Evacuations, loss of homes and 
businesses, and short-notice evacuations caused mental trauma for survivors.331 The 
effects of the wildfire smoke have yet to be seen but are anticipated to cause long-term 
harm, including increased disease and premature death.332 Moreover, direct economic 
losses and consequences in sectors such as tourism, hospitality, and agriculture 
significantly affected the economy of Australia.333 These direct damages to the economy 
are estimated at $5.6 billion and are combined with an estimated $2 billion in long-term 
health costs.334 It is too early to determine whether this disaster will have a long-term 
effect on Australia’s economy, but the long-term health costs are likely to continue to tax 
the economy in the coming years. Unlike unanticipated or surprising disasters, the effects 
of the wildfires on Australian citizens and their democracy will be drawn out over time 
with potential destabilizing ripples into the future due to the long-term nature of mental 
health challenges and public health issues. 
Political institutions in Australia maintained legitimacy, as demonstrated through 
citizen support and attentiveness. However, citizens blamed the national government for 
failing to prevent the bushfires by curbing climate change and for offering poor leadership 
in their time of need.335 Additionally, Burgess et al. found that “just under 12% of overall 
articles blamed the Coalition government for exacerbating the fires through lack of climate 
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action, lack of leadership or lack of funding to the State or Territory Rural Fire 
Services.”336 Protesters gathered in the thousands to advocate action about climate change, 
which has been linked to the fires.337 Despite these protests, the government has not 
implemented policies for climate action.338 In fact, the government has implemented 
policies to promote natural gas production as a strategy for economic recovery following 
the effects of COVID-19 in 2020, which will add to national emissions.339 These protests 
demonstrate the capacity of civil society to spur changes in national energy policies and 
strategies; these group movements are a sign of an active civil society, which is an essential 
component of a functioning democracy. However, the lack of government climate action 
or policy change indicates that civil society has not successfully influenced the political 
arena. 
Trust in Prime Minister Morrison and the government eroded for some in Australia 
following the disaster. Critics assert that the prime minister failed to anticipate the crisis 
and was slow to respond.340 Following the disaster, many citizens perceived that Morrison 
was leading poorly, exemplified by his family vacation to Hawaii in the midst of the 
bushfires.341 His support in the polls dropped sharply because of the disaster.342 However, 
as a result of his response to the subsequent COVID-19 emergency, his approval ratings 
increased significantly.343 Additionally, according to Edelman’s analysis, trust in the 
Australian government fell following the fires among the informed public but remained the 
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same among the mass population.344 Prior to the fires, Edelman’s Trust Index scored 
Australia at 68 points among the informed public, an all-time high.345 However, the survey 
also reported that citizens viewed the government as the least competent and ethical 
vis-à-vis other institutions such as media or businesses.346 Despite conversations that could 
potentially destabilize Australia’s democracy, including critiques of the national 
government’s leadership in the disaster—specifically the prime minister and erosion of 
trust in the national government—the government generally remained stable, according to 
surveys.  
3. Conclusions 
Although the effects on the citizens of Australia were relatively low compared to 
other recent wildfire disasters, such as wildfires affecting the United States, the number of 
hectares burned and the destruction of the ecological environment render this disaster one 
of the most significant in recent times. Complexity components of this disaster stem from 
the nature of wildfire and confusing roles and responsibilities within Australian disaster 
management arrangements. Indigenous people were disproportionately affected by the 
disaster due to preexisting racism and vulnerabilities. Other citizens may suffer long-term 
health effects because of exposure to wildfire smoke. Additionally, resource shortfalls 
challenged the response, despite international and military support. 
This disaster affected all aspects of civil society in Australia through the widespread 
environmental and public health impacts. The mental and public health effects of the 
disaster, lost businesses and agricultural land, and the ongoing threat of further losses due 
to increased building, drought, and climate change will continue to affect social and 
economic structures of Australia’s democracy in the future. Related misinformation and 
disinformation highlighted the discourse around climate change—and the purported 
arsonists who had caused the wildfires—with the aim of sowing confusion and deepening 
 





polarization to affect the civil and political components of democracy in Australia. Despite 
the erosion of trust in the prime minister’s leadership combined with misinformation and 
disinformation, the government retained legitimacy.  
As a result, Australian democracy survived. The Economist’s Intelligence Unit 
ranks Australia as tied with the Netherlands for nineth in its 2020 Democracy Index, 
making Australia a full democracy.347 Similarly, Freedom House’s 2020 report also ranks 
Australia as free, but dropping one point from the previous year’s ranking because of 
Australian Federal Police raids on the media, which damaged the nation’s free and 
independent media score.348 Despite the disruptions of the wildfires, Australia’s 
democracy remains strong. 
C. UNITED STATES: COVID-19 RESPONSE 
The global coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has had far-reaching 
effects across all nations, ranging from direct health and medical threats to citizens to 
cascading economic and other consequences of public health measures such as 
stay-at-home orders. As of January 11, 2021, the United States had over 22 million 
confirmed cases of COVID-19 and over 360,000 deaths.349 As of March 17, 2021, the 
United States has one of the highest confirmed cumulative cases in the world at close to 
89,000 cases per million people.350 
The World Health Organization (WHO) first became aware of an emerging disease 
involving respiratory effects in Wuhan, China, on December 31, 2019.351 By early January 
2020, Chinese authorities had determined that a novel coronavirus was the source of this 
viral pneumonia, and by the end of the month, researchers had determined that it could 
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potentially spread between individuals.352 The virus was first detected in the United States 
in late January 2020.353 By the end of February, the disease had spread across the country 
through community transmission.354 On February 11, the disease known as severe acute 
respiratory syndrome associated coronavirus, or SARS-CoV-2, gained a new name when 
the “WHO announced that the disease caused by the novel coronavirus would be named 
COVID-19.”355 One month later, on March 11, the WHO characterized the crisis as a 
pandemic due to its “alarming levels of spread and severity.”356 It spread quickly across 
the globe, prompting closures of schools, restriction of movement, and other public health 
measures aimed at slowing or stopping its spread. 
The U.S. strategy for reducing the effects of the pandemic has been to increase 
testing capabilities, detect new cases, conduct contract tracing, and implement social 
distancing and quarantine measures.357 The federal government also implemented 
international travel restrictions aimed at preventing the disease from entering the United 
States, and travelers experienced disruptions and quarantines while traveling on cruise 
ships.358 As COVID-19 spread, state governors enacted extensive closures of schools, 
businesses, and other parts of the economy.359 Most have reopened sectors of the economy, 
and many school districts have returned to in-person classes, but most have requirements 
in place to slow the spread such as social distancing and mask mandates.360 The economic 
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consequences of the disaster have continued to accrue, with job losses skyrocketing and 
unemployment rates near 15 percent.361 Government spending on the response combined 
with loss of tax revenues led to a record deficit of $3.1 trillion for fiscal year 2020.362 
Some citizens were vulnerable before the disaster because of their age and medical 
risk factors, living situations, socioeconomic status, race or ethnicity, and gender. For 
example, those most vulnerable to severe health effects or death have included “older 
adults” and “people with medical conditions” such as diabetes, cancer, or lung disease.363 
Additionally, individuals living in congregate settings—such as those experiencing 
homelessness, living in nursing homes or other long-term care facilities and group homes, 
or experiencing incarceration—are at an increased risk for infection.364 Moreover, 
researchers Patel et al. assert that people of low socioeconomic status are more likely to 
have unstable incomes or work in positions that are unlikely to allow for social distancing, 
are more likely to reside in crowded living conditions, and are less likely to obtain 
healthcare at an early stage of the disease; these circumstances increase the risk of 
contracting COVID-19 or experiencing severe disease within this demographic.365 About 
34 million people, or about 10.5 percent of the population, in the United States live in 
poverty.366 In addition, people from racial and ethnic minority groups in the United States 
are more likely to experience discrimination, lack healthcare access, or live or work in 
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high-risk environments, increasing their risk of getting sick or dying from the virus.367 The 
majority of U.S. citizens, around 76.3 percent, identify as white; the largest ethnic group 
comprises Hispanic or Latino people who represent 18.5 percent of the population.368 
Black, Latino, and other non-white households are more likely to experience hardship in 
putting food on the table, paying rent, or covering other household expenses during this 
disaster.369 Many Americans believe that racial inequality exists in the United States and 
that racial or ethnic discrimination, less access to high-paying jobs, and less access to a 
quality education are aspects of racism.370 Finally, gender discrimination also exists in the 
United States, with 42 percent of women reporting gender-related discrimination as well 
as unequal pay in the workplace.371 Similar to systemic racism or socioeconomic status, 
discrimination based on gender can increase the risk of contracting the virus or suffering 
from its effects. 
The federal response to this pandemic was marked by confusing roles and 
responsibilities as well as unclear and varying authorities. On January 29, 2020, President 
Trump announced that the newly formed President’s Coronavirus Task Force would lead 
the federal government’s response to the pandemic.372 Leadership from within various 
federal agencies formed this task force, which was charged with providing information to 
the government and public and leading the executive branch’s efforts to stop the spread of 
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the virus and mitigate its effects.373 In the United States, the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) is the lead federal agency for a pandemic response, and was the 
initial lead for responding to this pandemic.374 The Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) also “plays a central role in coordinating our federal support” as the 
designated agency to “lead the federal response in combating the Coronavirus.”375 
Additionally, the president authorized emergency financial assistance through a disaster 
declaration.376 The HHS secretary declared a public health emergency in late January 
2020, authorizing financial and other support to state, local, and tribal health 
departments.377 The Stafford Act, administered by FEMA, supplemented HHS authorities 
in the first ever nationwide emergency disaster declaration for all states, five territories, 
and the District of Columbia, as well as 32 tribal nations.378 Last, the Department of the 
Treasury has administered the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act and 
the Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2021, which 
provide financial support to individuals, businesses, and governments.379 The federal 
government’s response to the disaster was complicated by the multitude of operational 
coordination structures combined with differing and sometimes overlapping financial and 
funding authorities. 
The U.S. response to COVID-19 has been largely ineffective. The faulty and 
insufficient national testing capacity prevented the detection of COVID-19 and hampered 
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initial efforts to prevent its spread.380 Personal protective equipment (PPE) has also been 
in short supply throughout the response, an outcome of the combination of increased 
demand and international competition, offshore manufacturing, and an underfunded, 
understocked Strategic National Stockpile.381 The National Resource Prioritization Cell 
was established to help allocate the scarce PPE available, and the federal government 
implemented strategies such as preserving supplies and expanding available resources.382 
Last, the medical infrastructure has been unable to support the number of seriously ill, and 
nursing home residents have not been adequately protected.383 These shortfalls in medical 
capacity have prompted several states to issue their own medical ethical guidance, called 
crisis standards of care, each containing different standards for the ethical prioritization 
and treatment of patients.384 
The actions of leadership and the disjointed response hampered the government’s 
efforts to support the response to this pandemic. President Trump continuously 
downplayed the seriousness of the virus, predicting that it would disappear, promoting 
disinformation, and undermining the wearing of masks.385 Each state was responsible for 
developing and implementing decisions on closing and reopening government and 
economic functions, resulting in a patchwork of decisions about protective actions across 
the nation.386 Messaging around the effectiveness of wearing masks to slow or reduce the 
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spread of the disease was inconsistent and confusing and, combined with inconsistent 
messages from leadership, led to many individuals refusing to wear masks.387  
This disaster endures, and the United States continues to experience growth of the 
virus. Some states have successfully reopened schools, daycare centers, and retail outlets 
to support economic recovery while others have struggled to do so safely and been forced 
to close again.388 The government has also invested billions of dollars in vaccine 
development domestically in the hopes of further reopening the economy and returning to 
pre-COVID-19 activities.389 
1. Disinformation, Misinformation, and Malinformation Effects 
Social media has been used to share information widely throughout the COVID-19 
response. Although the availability of information benefits individuals and helps 
disseminate public health messages, the United Nations and the WHO have recognized that 
it can also be problematic, calling the abundance of information as well as spread of 
disinformation about the virus an “infodemic.”390 They describe the effects of 
misinformation and disinformation on the current response as follows:  
Misinformation costs lives. Without the appropriate trust and correct 
information, diagnostic tests go unused, immunization campaigns (or 
campaigns to promote effective vaccines) will not meet their targets, and 
the virus will continue to thrive. Furthermore, disinformation is polarizing 
public debate on topics related to COVID-19; amplifying hate speech; 
heightening the risk of conflict, violence and human rights violations; and 
threatening long-terms prospects for advancing democracy, human rights 
and social cohesion.391 
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In a recent study of traditional media, including engagement on social platforms, 
Evanega et al. identified 11 misinformation topics, including miracle cures, the most 
common topic, and government conspiracy or “deep state” activities, conspiracies about 
the origin of the disease as a bioweapon, and connections to individuals like Bill Gates or 
technologies such as 5G.392 These researchers also determined that leaders, specifically 
President Trump, contributed significantly to the spread of misinformation, along with 
groups and individuals.393 In an effort to combat misinformation and disinformation, 
FEMA has developed a webpage to combat specific rumors as well as encourage users to 
look for trusted sources and think before spreading unverified information.394  
Messaging that is clear, consistent, and accurate is critical to the success of public 
health efforts to mitigate and slow the spread of a pandemic like COVID-19. 
Misinformation and disinformation exacerbate fear and anxiety, confuse the public, and 
influence individuals to take actions that are damaging to themselves or other citizens.395 
State actors seeking to undermine the United States and other democracies use 
disinformation to achieve these goals, and non-state actors such as terrorist groups have 
used these tactics to recruit followers or encourage religious conversion.396 
Misinformation and disinformation in the COVID-19 disaster have deepened national 
divides and weakened public health measures, as well as sown confusion and distrust, 
thereby degrading the democratic functions of political and civil society in the United 
States. 
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2. Social, Economic, and Political Effects on Democracy 
The negative short- and long-term social effects of COVID-19, including mental 
health and economic concerns, are challenging American democracy. For instance, mental 
health challenges and related issues, such as addiction and suicide, have risen significantly 
as a result of the pandemic.397 Domestic violence and child abuse and neglect are also on 
the rise, fueled by stress, barriers to reporting, and economic instability.398 Additionally, 
burnout among medical workers and other front-line staff is significant, especially for 
less-experienced staff or those coping with supply shortages.399 Typical social activities 
such as group gatherings or parties and dining out have also slowed or stopped, though 
some visits with close family or friends have continued.400 In addition to changes in social 
habits, religious worship has shifted to online or virtual from in-person services.401 These 
trends have resulted in social isolation and loneliness for many citizens, especially 
adolescents and older adults, resulting in widespread consequences for mental health.402 
In some areas of the United States, however, social trust and responsibility have contributed 
to the effectiveness of public health measures, such as mask wearing.403 The civil society 
of an effective democracy requires strong social connections, yet public health measures 
have required such things as social distancing and curtailed organizations and groups from 
gathering, thereby exacerbating mental health issues. Nevertheless, in some areas, social 
trust and responsibility have contributed to an effective response. 
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The economic effects of this disaster on the United States have yet to be fully 
quantified. Shortages of workers, diminishing demand for goods produced by the 
agricultural sector, and travel restrictions and social distancing requirements significantly 
disrupted the hospitality, aviation, and travel industries.404 Additionally, citizens altered 
their habits and demands, affecting global supply chains, decreasing the demand for oil, 
and reducing enrollment in educational institutions.405 Other aspects of the economy such 
as sporting and leisure and even healthcare institutions have been altered as well.406 Lauren 
Bauer et al. found that those most affected by the disaster include vulnerable populations 
such as “women, non-white workers, lower-wage earners, and those with less 
education.”407 Non-essential small businesses whose employees could not work remotely 
were acutely affected by the restrictions imposed by the government to slow the spread of 
the virus.408 These disruptions have led to steep drops in the nation’s GDP and have 
resulted in an economic recession.409 The effects of these economic challenges on 
individuals were manifest in food insecurity—magnified by panic-buying, strains in the 
supply chain, the high cost of food, the lack of income, and interruptions to normal safety 
nets such as school lunches or food deliveries to vulnerable populations.410 The rates of 
food insecurity or low food security has doubled from pre-pandemic rates, prompting the 
implementation of government programs to address these issues, such as increased funding 
to compensate for school meals lost when the schools closed.411 Homelessness has been 
expected to rise due to economic consequences and unemployment, with some estimating 
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that nearly 250,000 people became homeless in 2020 alone.412 Although the economic 
effects of this disaster on democracy are not yet known, vulnerable populations have been 
disproportionately affected based on their race, gender, and socioeconomic status, and 
national-level economic losses are significant and may serve to disrupt democratic 
functions in the United States. 
Voters were sometimes divided by political party on views of the federal 
government’s response to COVID-19, and trust in government agencies, institutions, and 
leadership fell, thereby affecting the political institutions of the United States. Public 
opinion of the nation’s response was the lowest of 14 advanced economies surveyed in 
2020, with 52 percent of respondents stating that the government had “done a bad job 
dealing with the coronavirus outbreak.”413 Before the pandemic, the citizens of the United 
States were slightly distrustful, with the Edelman Trust Barometer reporting an average of 
49 percent trust in non-governmental organizations, businesses, government, and the media 
in 2019.414 Trust in the United States initially increased during this disaster, with a six-
point increase in trust between the Edelman Trust Barometer results from January 2020 
and the spring update in May.415 However, initial reports in 2021 have shown a drop below 
pre-disaster levels, with this organization reporting an average trust score of 48 percent.416 
Furthermore, trust in government agencies such as the Centers for Disease Control and 
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Prevention and the Food and Drug Administration has fallen during this public health crisis 
because of inconsistent messaging and the perception of political interference.417  
Initially, the country was divided on President Trump’s handling of COVID-19, 
with 50 percent of those responding to an April 2020 Gallup poll approving and 48 percent 
disapproving.418 These results were split across party lines, with a large majority of 
Republicans and a minority of Democrats approving of Trump’s handling of the crisis, and 
47 percent of independents approving.419 COVID-19 combined with racial injustice 
protests across the country led to President Trump’s approval ratings falling to 39 percent 
by June 2020.420 Although it is unclear whether the pandemic directly influenced voters’ 
choices, President Trump was voted out of office in November 2020.421 Despite voters’ 
describing the pandemic as an important issue for the nation, surveys show that the relative 
importance of the disaster divided along party lines and that President Trump may have 
received more votes in some of the areas most affected by the pandemic—though causation 
is unknown for voter support in these localities.422 As demonstrated through these national 
elections, the pandemic has deepened political divides in the country, with issues such as 
mask wearing and social distancing breaking along party lines.423 A large majority—77 
percent—of those surveyed think that the United States is more divided than before 
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COVID-19.424 Additionally, some point out that the restrictions on movement and fewer 
social interactions could exacerbate political divisions.425 Political institutions in the 
United States have maintained legitimacy, as demonstrated through citizen support and 
attentiveness, but the disaster has negatively affected components of civil support for the 
national government, including trust and political divisions. 
3. Conclusions 
The expansive individual and societal effects of COVID-19 both internationally 
and in the United States suggest that it may be one of the most significant disasters in 
history. The complexity of this disaster is related to the global interconnectedness of 
society and economies as well as the significant disruptions caused by measures taken to 
slow the spread of the virus. Some U.S. citizens are more vulnerable to these disaster 
consequences because of their socioeconomic status, ethnicity, or gender; pre-existing 
medical conditions; or congregate living conditions—all of which have increased the risk 
of contracting the virus. Despite executive-level leadership and support from federal and 
state emergency management and public health departments and agencies, the U.S. 
response to COVID-19 has been ineffective. Necessary supplies were unavailable to 
protect medical providers and vulnerable populations, and surges in COVID-19 patients 
overwhelmed the medical infrastructure. National leadership provided the public with 
confusing and disjointed messaging and ultimately left actions and decisions to each state, 
resulting in a patchwork of response actions. Although modern societies are highly 
connected, a lack of a strong national government response to this pandemic has created 
the conditions for disparate public health responses and increased the negative effects on 
vulnerable populations. This ineffective response has the potential to reduce the stability 
of the U.S. democracy as the disaster endures—or even subsides. 
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The closures and economic restrictions implemented because of COVID-19 
affected all aspects of civil society in the United States, including public health, economic 
functions, and political polarization. The mental and public health effects of the disaster, 
economic losses, business closures, and the unknown timeline and mechanism for returning 
to normal continue to affect social and economic structures; the long-term outcome of this 
disaster is unknown. Misinformation and disinformation campaigns were prevalent in this 
disaster and amplified by the president, resulting in increased anxiety and confusion, 
decreased trust, and deepened polarization, all of which affect the political component of 
American democracy. Despite this polarization and the social and economic effects of the 
disaster combined with misinformation and disinformation, as of this writing, the 
government has retained legitimacy—but trust has decreased. 
Despite retaining legitimacy, the democracy of the United States is showing signs 
of decline. Freedom House categorized the United States as free in its 2020 analysis, 
despite acknowledging the recent erosion of democratic institutions such as disparate 
opportunities, systemic biases, and electoral manipulation.426 Similarly, the Economist’s 
Intelligence Unit downgraded the United States to a flawed democracy in 2016, where it 
remained in 2020.427 Despite gains in political participation, the United States lost ground 
in social cohesion with deepening political and social divides, growing conspiracy theories 
fueled by social media, and constrained freedom of expression on social media 
platforms.428 In its Democracy Index 2020, the Economist’s Intelligence Unit describes 
the effects of the pandemic on democracy as increasing political participation because of 
the politicization of the disaster, while also contributing to the selective suppression of 
content by social media platforms.429 It is too soon to say whether the U.S. democracy will 
be resilient enough to survive these challenges, but early signs point to conditions ripe for 
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further democratic decline because of political and social divides and the effects of social 
media on society. 
D. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
False information and complex disasters compounded vulnerabilities, disrupted 
societal structures, and exceeded national capacities to provide for the basic needs of 
citizens. This comparative case study analysis revealed a weakened democracy in the 
United States yet stable democracies in Australia and Japan. Each of these disasters 
triggered significant disruptions to national social, economic, and political systems 
required by a fully functioning democracy. Although all governments examined 
maintained legitimacy following their respective disasters, national leaders and 
governments lost credibility and trust. In addition, these disasters and the effects of mis-, 
dis-, and mal-information disrupted the social and economic institutions of democracy 
through wide-ranging effects on citizens—especially vulnerable populations—including 
societal disruptions, degraded social structures, and economic losses combined with 
significant disaster-related expenses. This section analyzes the consequences of these 
disasters and false information on the institutions of democracy in these countries. 
Table 1 summarizes the effects of the disaster and mis-, dis-, and mal-information 
on the democracy of each case study, with a focus on the social, economic, and political 
institutions. It shows that the disaster’s effects were widespread and that misinformation 
and disinformation were detected in each case. Finally, it shows the relative effects on 






Table 1. Comparative Case Study Summary 
Case Disaster Effects 
Mis-, Dis-, and 
Mal-Information 
Effects 
Effects on Democratic Institutions 










Moderate Social Effects: public and 
mental health  
High Economic Effects: demonstrated 
economic recovery 
Moderate Political Effects: national 
political trust eroded, local trust increased; 











Low Social Effects: public and health  
Moderate Economic Effects: unknown 
recovery 
Moderate Political Effects: citizens 
advocated policy changes, confusing roles 











High Social Effects: public mental health 
effects; social responsibility undermined 
by national leaders 
High Economic Effects: unknown 
recovery 
Moderate Political Effects: polarization 
increased; confusing roles and 
responsibilities for disaster response 
 
1. Disaster Effects 
Each of these disasters exhibited unique complexity factors that resulted in 
significant social and environmental harm and resulted in considerable government and 
community involvement in the disaster response. For example, the global nature and 
unknown transmission and treatment for COVID-19 shaped all aspects of society; this 
uncertainty marked it as different from most other natural disasters, as did the economic 
consequences and significant death toll. Similarly, the unpredictability of the catastrophic 
bushfires in Australia as well as the widespread damages to the environment and degraded 
public health affected citizens well beyond the burn areas. In Japan, the number of lives 
lost and people displaced combined with lasting economic impacts altered the country, 
while in Australia, the damages to the landscape and sensitive ecosystems left lasting scars. 
Although the complexity factors differ, this research finds common themes of 
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unpredictability for the disaster effects and outcomes that altered the environment and 
people of these countries.  
In all three disasters, vulnerable populations were disproportionately affected in 
comparison to other members of the population. Vulnerable citizens included the elderly 
and people living in poverty in Japan and in the United States. Additionally, populations 
experiencing discrimination and preexisting medical conditions were at heightened risk in 
the U.S. and Australian disasters. These vulnerable populations had decreased power and 
were less able to adapt to the social and economic disruptions of the disasters, exposing 
societal divides and challenging social relationships and structures. In each of these 
disasters, societal weaknesses highlighted by these vulnerable populations threaten to 
degrade the social relationships and structures necessary for a functioning democracy. 
The severity of the disaster, including complicating factors and significant response 
requirements, exceeds the capacity of the government and community responders to deliver 
required resources in each of these cases. In Japan, assistance to disaster survivors was 
delayed by degraded communication and transportation systems as well as complications 
resulting from the cascading nature of the earthquake, tsunami, and ultimately the 
meltdown at the Fukashima nuclear power plant. Similarly, stay-at-home orders and social 
distancing requirements interrupted the economy and supply chains, preventing individuals 
affected by COVID-19 in the United States from obtaining essential goods and services, 
such as food, housing, and medical care. These disruptions complicated the national 
government’s disaster response in both Japan and the United States. Additionally, shortfalls 
in their national response capacities required the deployment of international support to 
augment response efforts in Japan and Australia. Similarly, the national military was 
activated in support of the government’s response in all three disasters. The government’s 
request for international resources and activation of the national military—thereby 
degrading readiness for a conflict—illustrate that typical local and national assets were 
insufficient to meet the needs of each disaster. Due to these resource shortfalls, the 
wellbeing of citizens was negatively affected, as government and community groups were 
unable to provide for the basic needs of some individuals affected by these disasters. 
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While the U.S. response to COVID-19 was viewed as ineffective, the responses in 
Japan and Australia were generally viewed as successful, despite significant complications 
and resource shortfalls. Unlike the United States, both Japan and Australia benefitted from 
volunteer and community group support of the governments’ disaster response efforts. In 
addition, the extent of the disaster and proximity of citizens to the destruction affected 
individual views of disaster response effectiveness. For example, the pandemic in the 
United States was unique among these three disasters because it significantly affected all 
citizens in the country. As a result, volunteer and other aid groups that would normally 
augment the federal government’s disaster response were largely unavailable. In both 
Japan and Australia, on the other hand, volunteers and community groups played a 
significant role in providing disaster relief. Additionally, although devastating to the 
burned area, the wildfires were not an immediate or personal threat to many living in 
Australia. In contrast, the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear power plant disaster in Japan 
directly or indirectly affected most Japanese citizens. Although many considerations 
contribute to citizen perceptions of a national government’s response to a catastrophic 
disaster, the complexity, system disruptions, proximity, and extent of the disaster are 
leading factors. Similarly, citizens’ perceptions of the effectiveness of a national disaster 
response are influenced by how well their basic needs are met by the government and 
volunteer or community aid group resources. 
These disaster responses were unpredictable and complicated, and included 
disruptions of people and the environment, including disproportionate effects on 
vulnerable individuals. Ultimately, citizens’ perceptions of the disaster response were 
influenced by the extent of disruptions, resource availability, and community support. 
2. Disinformation, Misinformation, and Malinformation Effects 
False information that spread on social media in each of these disasters confused 
individuals and undermined effective government responses by disrupting the sensemaking 
and meaning-making processes that are essential to societal stabilization. Misinformation 
was the most common type of information disorder observed in these disasters; however, 
disinformation was also present. Japan’s 3/11 disaster was the first large-scale incident in 
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which social media played a significant role in the sensemaking process for those both 
affected by the disasters and living outside the impact area. The false information that 
spread in this disaster caused confusion and anger among the citizens, centering on the 
effects and safety following the Fukashima plant meltdown. The utility responsible for the 
nuclear emergency contributed to the turmoil by spreading disinformation about Prime 
Minister Kan to shift blame to the government and failing to reveal information about the 
severity of the crisis at Fukushima.  
Since the 2011 disaster in Japan, social media platforms have continued to play a 
significant role in disasters, including both the Australian bushfires and the COVID-19 
pandemic. Rumors spread in the United States that the danger of the pandemic was 
exaggerated, and misleading photos of the fires and climate denialism circulated in 
Australia. Misinformation was also spread by individuals and leaders such as President 
Trump, whose communications and meaning-making weakened efforts to slow the spread 
of the virus in the United States, by politicizing public health measures such as wearing 
masks in public areas. Additionally, users spread disinformation that the Australian 
bushfires were set by arson to create a negative narrative about climate protesters, resulting 
in confusion and polarization. Last, state-sponsored disinformation was distributed in the 
United States about COVID-19, with the goal of undermining trust, causing confusion, and 
deepening national divides. The mis-, dis-, and mal-information encountered during these 
disasters caused confusion and anger, eroded the credibility of leaders, decreased trust, and 
deepened polarization and societal divides, which damaged the social and political 
institutions of these national democracies.  
Despite the challenges of false information spread during these disasters, however, 
state legitimacy was maintained. These democracies resisted destabilization because each 
government and others, such as media platforms and individuals, countered confusing and 
polarizing false information by correcting rumors or supplying accurate information on 
platforms as part of the sensemaking process. Additionally, governments, leaders, and 
prominent citizens participated in meaning-making efforts, facilitating continued support 
from citizens. Social media, while a platform for the spread of false information, also 
enabled the sensemaking and meaning-making processes. 
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False information contributed to confusion, anger, polarization, and distrust. 
However, these effects were countered by corrective sensemaking and meaning-making 
processes. 
3. Social, Economic, and Political Effects on Democracy 
Despite the magnitude of disaster damages and the effects of misinformation and 
disinformation, each of these governments have maintained legitimacy. However, 
democracy was challenged in each country because of the effects of the disasters and mis-, 
dis-, and mal-information on the social, economic, and political institutions that are 
required to sustain democracy. Despite the disruptions caused by these disasters and the 
spread of false information, the democracies of both Japan and Australia remained strong 
and fully functional. These states did not sustain lasting damage to democratic 
consolidation. Although it is too early to know whether the democracy of the United States 
will withstand the challenges of COVID-19, political and social divides exacerbated by 
pervasive misinformation and disinformation and propagated on social media may have 
long-term effects on its society and democracy. These democracies and their institutions 
were each affected by these disasters, yet at this time, all have maintained legitimacy and 
remained fully functioning. 
In each of these cases, vulnerabilities in the population, combined with disaster-
caused mental and public health effects and degraded social structures, delayed national 
stabilization. For example, the pandemic caused social isolation and loneliness as well as 
burnout in medical and front-line workers in the United States, and the virus also led to 
widespread public health challenges. Similarly, friends and neighbors were displaced by 
the tsunami, and concerns about the long-term effects of radiation exposure in Japan 
affected public and mental health in the country. Last, evacuations caused mental trauma 
and displaced individuals in Australia, and the smoke from the wildfires is expected to 
cause long-term public health issues. These disasters degraded social institutions by 
undermining social relationships, challenging mental health, and creating long-term public 
health threats. 
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Despite these effects on mental and public health and social structures, however, 
the beliefs and actions of residents upheld these social institutions. In each of these cases, 
citizens assisted states in maintaining legitimacy. For example, following the earthquake 
and tsunami in Japan, a spotlight was put on social cohesion and cultural norms that 
encouraged stabilization and whole-of-community support through volunteers and 
neighborhood groups, enabling Japan to recover from this disaster. Similarly, the 
Australian disaster response was manned primarily by organized volunteer firefighters 
engaging the community in the disaster response. In some parts of the United States, 
actions inspired by social responsibility, such as wearing masks, helped to slow the spread 
of COVID-19. However, simultaneously, national leaders politicized public health 
measures, and polarization grew within the populace, thereby undermining social cohesion. 
Although the effects of a disaster on citizens—especially vulnerable populations—degrade 
the effectiveness of the social institutions of a democracy, social cohesion and community 
involvement in the disaster response efforts enhanced these institutions and helped all three 
democracies retain legitimacy. 
The economic institutions of each of these countries were affected by societal 
disruptions and large national expenditures aimed at helping to rebuild and recover from 
the disasters. In the United States, business closures and lost revenue disrupted the 
economy because of public health measures aimed to slow the spread of the virus. 
Additionally, national funding enabled the purchase of equipment and supplies as well as 
spurred research and development of vaccines and funding of social programs. On the other 
hand, economic losses in Japan and Australia were the result of physical damages to homes, 
businesses, and infrastructure as well as business losses, yet government programs funded 
the basic needs of affected individuals. Japan’s economy has rebounded since the 2011 
disaster; however, it is too early to say whether the Australian or U.S. economies will 
similarly rebound. Democracies benefit from stable economies, which were disrupted by 
these disasters. In these cases, disruptions to economic institutions have not yet caused 
democratic decline because each country enacted national economic recovery initiatives, 
such as supplemental or social program funding, contributing to societal stabilization and 
citizen support of the state. 
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Support of leadership and trust in national governments fell in each of these cases 
because citizens perceived national leaders and governments as ineffective. Citizens expect 
government leaders to manage the response to a crisis, especially when the result is chaos 
and uncertainty in the wake of a complex disaster. Additionally, public opinion and support 
before the crisis influence support of leaders and the government after a disaster. For 
example, the Japanese and Australian prime ministers and U.S. president all faced low 
public opinion before these disasters. Afterward, citizens continued to disapprove of 
Japanese Prime Minister Kan as well as the response of the national government, which 
was viewed as ineffective, poorly managed, and contributing to fear and uncertainty, 
especially following the radiological effects of the disaster. Local political leaders in Japan, 
on the other hand, were generally described as effective and gained strength following the 
disaster. Citizens also continued to disapprove of Prime Minister Morrison’s leadership in 
Australia as well as the overall government response; however, protesters advocated policy 
changes on climate change rather than to the political system. Likewise, support for 
President Trump fell in the United States; he led an unsuccessful bid at reelection during 
the pandemic.  
In addition, confusion within national governments damaged the public’s 
perception of the effectiveness of the disaster response; this was the case in each of these 
disasters. For example, the Japanese government responded with new coordinating bodies, 
causing confusion. Similarly, new coordinating entities were established in the United 
States to support the pandemic, and roles and responsibilities between federal organizations 
were unclear. Additionally, disaster response roles, responsibilities, and authorities in 
Australia were confusing, and the response was viewed as delayed and ineffective at using 
the full resources of the government. Citizen perceptions of leaders and national 
government action or inaction in response to these disasters, combined with confusion and 
loss of trust, damaged the political institutions in each case. However, despite these 
damages, each state maintained its legitimacy because it engaged in meaning-making 
processes, citizens continued to provide support, and in some cases, voters turned their 
attention to electing new leaders. 
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The democracies of Japan and Australia remain strong, but there are concerning 
signs in the United States; it is too early to know the long-term effect of the pandemic on 
its democracy. Public and mental health effects from all three disasters were countered by 
social cohesion and community involvement. Each economy was affected; Japan has 
recovered while economic recovery remains to be seen in the United States and Australia. 
Trust and support of leadership were eroded in each case, and confusing disaster 
coordination structures or responsibilities amplified damages to political institutions; 
however, meaning-making and citizen support contributed to sustained legitimacy. 
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IV. FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis explored the effects of complex disasters, the resilience and 
vulnerability of the population, the quality of the response, and the influences of mis-, dis-, 
and mal-information on the social, political, and economic institutions of a democracy. To 
this end, it included a comparative case study analysis of the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake, 
tsunami, and nuclear power plant disaster in Japan; the Australian wildfires of 2019–2020; 
and the ongoing COVID-19 response in the United States that began in 2020. The analysis 
of these case studies concluded that socially constructed legitimacy can be undermined by 
forces that amplify and intensify existing social divides and create instability, including 
false information and disasters that alter the environment and social structures. However, 
governments and individuals can support democratic legitimacy by countering disruptions 
caused by false information and disasters. This support is accomplished through 
sensemaking and constructive meaning-making, building social relationships and 
cohesion, enhancing community involvement in disaster response, and taking actions to 
stabilize the situation that provide for the basic needs of survivors and societal recovery.  
This thesis set out to explain how democratic governments could maintain 
legitimacy after a catastrophic disaster in the age of mis-, dis-, and mal-information. It finds 
that these effects combine to exacerbate societal divides and weaknesses that undermine 
trust, and ultimately degrade democratic institutions. This thesis recommends that 
democratic governments build trust and enhance online and in-person communities and 
networks to enable an effective disaster response and counter the effects of false 
information through a model of social disaster response. 
A. FINDINGS 
As described by Linz and Stepan, social, economic, and political institutions, along 
with other conditions such as bureaucracy and rule of law, are required to maintain the 
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legitimacy of a state.430 The resilience of a state is enabled by trust, which is viewed 
through the lens of citizen support and attentiveness because the legitimacy of democratic 
institutions is socially constructed. However, both government resilience and democratic 
legitimacy are challenged by individual vulnerabilities, political divides, societal 
weaknesses, and poor leadership. The democratic states reviewed in these case studies each 
maintained legitimacy. Despite the disruptions caused by these disasters and the spread of 
false information, the democracies of both Japan and Australia remain strong and fully 
functional. These states did not sustain lasting damage to democratic consolidation; 
however, the long-term effects of the pandemic on the democracy of the United States 
remain to be seen. 
Table 2 summarizes the primary findings of this thesis, drawing from the literature 
review and case studies to identify themes that sustain democratic legitimacy in a disaster 
when false information is spread. These primary findings involve trust; leadership in a 
crisis; and community-building through social capital, social responsibility, and support of 
human rights or equity. 
Table 2. Primary Findings 
Theme Finding 
Trust 
Inadequate or disorganized disaster responses, ineffective leadership, and 
false information undermine trust in governments and leaders, degrading 
democracy. Effective disaster response—which includes meeting the 
basic needs of citizens—builds trust. 
Leadership in a Crisis: 
Sensemaking and Meaning-
Making 
Leaders contribute to building trust through the meaning-making and 
sensemaking processes, such as through online communities and social 
media platforms. 
Communities 
Communities are undermined by severe and complex disasters, degraded 
public and mental health, and online polarization. Disparities between 
vulnerable and resilient populations and divides that are exacerbated 
online highlight societal weaknesses. However, online communities can 
also form, contributing to an effective disaster response. 
Social Capital, Social 
Responsibility, and 
Adaptation 
Disaster responders support an effective community recovery by 
reestablishing social capital, encouraging social responsibility, and 
adapting to the needs of individuals and communities. 
 
 
430 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 40. 
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1. Trust 
Inadequate or disorganized disaster response, ineffective leadership, and false 
information undermine trust in governments and leaders, degrading democracy. 
Democratic legitimacy is socially constructed by individuals and communities and closely 
related to trust; democracies are more resilient and less likely to undergo a regime change 
when citizen trust or satisfaction with government support is high. Without a successful 
disaster response, individuals and communities could withdraw their support of the 
government, leadership, or political parties. As a result, democratic legitimacy or the power 
of political elites weakens. National responses were hampered in each case by citizen 
perceptions of poor leadership, compounded by confusing roles and responsibilities, new 
coordination structures, and the spread of false information online. The analysis of the case 
studies revealed that citizens in each of these disasters perceived national leadership in the 
disasters as ineffective, thus eroding trust. A successful disaster response combined with 
credible and effective leadership enables the stability of a democratic state. 
Effective disaster response—which includes meeting the basic needs of citizens—
builds trust. Governments and community responders are expected to manage complex 
disasters effectively and meet basic needs such as shelter, food, and water. Collaboration 
between the government and community responders is especially important when disasters 
cause system disruptions and lead to significant resource shortfalls. Disaster-related system 
interruptions are complicating factors that contribute to incident complexity, and individual 
perceptions of the disaster are related to the extent of the disaster and individual proximity 
to it. The magnitude of survivor requirements in each of the cases exceeded the capacity of 
governments and volunteer and community responders to meet citizens’ basic needs, 
harming those individuals and disrupting social structures. The analysis of the cases 
revealed that despite significant complications and resource shortfalls, citizens in two of 
the three countries viewed the management of these disasters as effective, which may have 
been influenced by the extent of damages and their proximity. These disasters undermined 
citizens’ trust in their governments, yet these states continued to perform essential 
functions and sustained legitimacy through the provision of direct assistance and economic 
recovery initiatives, including disaster relief funds, to meet the basic needs of citizens.  
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In summary, citizen trust and support enable democratic legitimacy and are 
enhanced by an effective disaster response to extensive and complex disasters. Trust in 
government was eroded in these cases by disorganized and confusing disaster responses 
and false information spread online about the disasters and government leadership. Despite 
the complexity of these disaster responses, citizens viewed the management of these 
disasters as effective in two of the three cases, and each of these governments maintained 
its legitimacy. 
2. Crisis Leadership 
Leaders contribute to building trust through the meaning-making process, including 
through online communities and social media platforms. The description of effective crisis 
leadership by Boin et al. is particularly apt:  
[When] an emerging crisis is swiftly detected, responders understand what 
is happening, critical decisions are made by the right people, the efforts of 
responders are orchestrated, government communicates with its citizens, 
and the aftermath of a crisis is marked by proper accountability and a 
willingness to collectively learn the lessons of that crisis.431  
Fulfilling these responsibilities lends credibility to leaders, who can leverage their 
influence to shape the opinions of citizens and communities to enhance legitimacy through 
the steps that Boin et al. describe—sensemaking, decision-making and coordinating, 
meaning-making, accounting, and learning.432 National leaders leverage the process of 
meaning-making to inspire confidence and enhance their credibility. In each of the case 
studies discussed in this thesis, however, citizens lost trust in their national leaders because 
of decisions made, inaction, or poor communications. These national leaders failed to 
engage in a positive, effective, or timely meaning-making process. As a result, some of 
these leaders lost power. Despite degraded support of prominent national government 
leadership in each of the cases, these democratic states maintained their legitimacy because 
the governments allowed citizens to voice their concerns through freedom of speech and 
enabled voters to make leadership changes through free and fair elections. 
 
431 Boin et al., The Politics of Crisis Management, 3. 
432 Boin et al., 14–15. 
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Leaders also contribute to building trust through the sensemaking process. Leaders, 
citizens, and responder networks increasingly conduct sensemaking online by leveraging 
social media platforms. These tools are used before, during, and after a disaster to 
understand and share information rapidly about the complex environment. In all three of 
the disaster cases, online platforms contributed to the sensemaking process; however, these 
platforms enabled the spread of mis-, dis-, and mal-information, which disrupted this 
process. Additionally, the president of the United States undermined the sensemaking 
process in the COVID-19 pandemic by spreading misinformation and disputing the 
messages of public health experts. Humans are prone to confusion or reaction to these 
forces because of reinforcement from cognitive biases, information overload, and 
ambiguous information shared online through techniques such as comingling news and 
entertainment content. Additionally, humans communicate through storytelling, and social 
media platforms provide opportunities for individuals and groups to amplify certain 
messages and stories and engender emotional reactions. Online networks also help to 
spread false information by leveraging human tendencies to believe information endorsed 
by family and friends and accept the first information seen on a topic. Options for reducing 
the effects of mis-, dis-, and mal-information on individuals and society include reducing 
the flow or reception of false information, enhancing critical-thinking skills, and increasing 
media literacy. In the cases examined, governments countered false information by 
correcting online rumors or providing accurate information to aid the sensemaking process. 
In sum, leaders build trust with a society by engaging in meaning-making and 
sensemaking through communications with the public and responders. However, citizen 
trust and perceptions of leadership are damaged by the spread of misinformation and 
disinformation. In these cases, leaders provided the public with response resources, enabled 
free and fair elections, and engaged with communities online to help counter these effects. 
However, some of these leaders failed to engage effectively in the sensemaking and 
meaning-making processes, resulting in degraded trust but not a loss of state legitimacy. 
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3. Communities 
Communities are undermined by severe and complex disasters, degraded public 
and mental health, and online polarization. In each case study, the environment and  
people were significantly affected by unpredictable or complex disasters that altered these 
nations. Additionally, social relationships were weakened by disaster effects such as mental 
health challenges and long-term public health consequences, degrading the social 
institutions of these democracies. Last, citizens were affected by the spread of false 
information online, which resulted in confusion and undermined trust by manipulating 
public opinion and targeting societal divides and systemic weaknesses or vulnerabilities. 
Unfortunately, the case study analysis also demonstrated that misinformation and 
disinformation disrupted social structures by causing confusion, anger, and polarization, 
and deepening national divides. 
Societal weaknesses are highlighted by disparities between vulnerable and resilient 
populations and divides that are exacerbated online. A disaster disrupts a community’s 
normal social, political, and economic processes and affects social structures. Vulnerable 
individuals in the community are more likely to experience loss, and less able to adapt to 
the situation.433 For instance, individuals with low socioeconomic status or other risk 
factors, such as low power status, are unlikely to obtain disaster support because of 
systemic social roadblocks and a lack of resources to enable adaptation. Resilient 
individuals, on the other hand, frequently obtain needed resources without government 
support following a disaster. Each of the case studies exposed unique complexity factors, 
but common to all three were vulnerable populations affected more severely than others. 
The effects of a crisis are manifested differently for vulnerable and resilient populations; 
these disparate effects, combined with societal divides, degrade citizen trust and 
democratic stability.  
Furthermore, self-organizing online communities form in a disaster; these groups 
are guided by social structures and norms that enable individuals and groups to solve 
problems through collaboration. These online communities are similar to emergent 
 
433 Tierney, Disasters, 143, 171. 
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responders supporting government response efforts and are particularly important when 
traditional means of sensemaking are not available because of impacts to communication 
systems or other constraints. The case studies demonstrated that social media expands 
disaster networks and communities for both individuals and responders and contributes to 
an effective disaster response. 
In conclusion, the social relationships comprising a community are weakened by 
disasters that degrade public and mental health and the polarizing effects of false 
information spreading online. Additionally, an unbalanced distribution of disaster 
resources and economic recovery packages exacerbates existing societal divides and 
inequities, thus undermining communities. However, newly formed online communities 
can contribute to an effective disaster response. The case study analysis demonstrated  
that disasters disproportionately affected vulnerable populations, polarization disrupted 
social structures in these counties, and misinformation and disinformation exacerbated 
national divides. 
4. Social Capital, Social Responsibility, and Human Rights or Equity 
Disaster responders support an effective community recovery by reestablishing 
social capital, encouraging social responsibility, and adapting to the needs of individuals 
and communities. Additionally, social cohesion and community involvement in disaster 
response efforts enhance the effectiveness of democratic institutions. The case study 
analysis revealed that cohesion and cultural norms, social responsibility, volunteerism, and 
a common purpose or culture contributed to disaster relief efforts and national stabilization. 
Although this research showed that these factors enhanced disaster response and 
community resilience in each of these cases, it is unclear whether the national governments 
studied encouraged their development or they occurred because of other factors such as a 
shared culture or common societal core values.  
Additionally, involving community groups and considering social capital, 
vulnerability, and resilience in the disaster response are also important for successful 
national recovery. Responders effectively support citizens by adapting and considering 
vulnerable and resilient populations’ requirements as well as preexisting societal 
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inequities. Survivor needs, including those of vulnerable populations in a community, are 
considerable in catastrophic disasters, and resources may be insufficient to meet them, 
requiring adaptation as well as equitable and ethical allocation of these scarce resources. 
Equity means that the vulnerability and resilience of individuals and groups within the 
community are considered and that, to the extent possible, systemic societal inequities are 
not perpetuated through disaster relief. Systemic inequality issues degrade social 
relationships and require enhanced support to build resilience, such as development of 
social cohesion and responsibility in a community and support of individual human rights. 
After a disaster, individuals within these communities display varying levels of 
vulnerability and resilience and will require equitable allocation of resources, individual 
benefits, and improvisation and adaptability. 
Overall, the communities that make up a society are bound by social cohesion and 
social responsibility as well as community involvement in the response to a disaster. These 
help to reduce polarization and enable community stabilization following a complex 
disaster. This case study research revealed that social capital and responsibility and 
community involvement in the disaster response can reduce disruptions to democracies.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This research finds that individuals, communities, and democratic institutions are 
affected by disasters combined with mis-, dis-, and mal-information. These challenges are 
exacerbated by chaos and uncertainty in the operational environment of a disaster and the 
online information environment. As a result, citizen trust in the social, economic, and 
political institutions of a democracy is eroded, damaging the legitimacy and stability of 
democratic states, as demonstrated by the case studies. 
In order to combat these effects on citizens and democracy, responders should 
deliver an effective disaster response by enacting an equitable, ethical distribution of 
resources that meets the basic needs of citizens, rapidly adapting to the situation, and 
clearly communicating. These actions result in the delivery of resources, through funding 
and direct support, that build citizen trust and support of their governments. Additionally, 
responders must consider the needs of the community, including individual vulnerabilities, 
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resilience, and equity, in the disaster response. These actions enhance governmental 
resilience, enabling democratic states to maintain legitimacy and trust when affected by a 
crisis such a disaster or attacks that leverage false information. There is no single method 
for ensuring resilience or legitimacy; governments must tailor their approaches and be 
prepared to adapt to new or emerging situations to enhance and support affected 
communities. This thesis proposes a model for individual, community, and government 
networks to evaluate the effects of a disaster and false information on democratic 
institutions and strengthen and uphold the integrity of their democracies in times of crisis. 
1. Social Response to Disasters Model 
When the core values of a democracy are threatened by a crisis, such as a disaster 
combined with the spread of false information, shared societal values and the resilience of 
individuals and communities influence the outcome. The frameworks that made up this 
thesis include sensemaking, crisis leadership, and the social production of disaster, overlaid 
with democratic institutions. 
This thesis proposes a model that describes disaster responder actions and networks 
that will effectively sustain democracy when citizens are harmed by the combined forces 
of severe or catastrophic disasters and mis-, dis-, and mal-information. Kathleen Tierney 
describes the severity of disasters in terms of their “social production,” emphasizing “social 
structures and social processes” rather than the physical effects of a disaster.434 This model 
builds on Tierney’s principles and the other primary frameworks to propose a social 
response to disasters model, which describes responder actions that enable networks to 
uphold democratic institutions when challenged by disasters and false information. Each 
of the model’s components contributes to the culminating goal of maintaining state 
legitimacy by building trust and resilient communities. 
Figure 1 describes the relationship of responder actions—including sensemaking, 
meaning-making, adaptation, community stabilization, and ethics and equity—to the 
social, political, and economic institutions of a democracy. Similarly, it describes the 
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relationship of the components of responder networks—volunteers and community 
responders, online and in-person communities, and governments—to these same 
institutions.  
 
Figure 1. Social Response to Disasters Model 
a. Responder Actions 
When implemented, the responder actions proposed by this model will enhance or 
maintain legitimacy of the democratic institutions by building trust and enhancing 
communities. These actions are critical when citizens are affected by the combined forces 
of complex disasters and false information. 
b. Sensemaking 
Responder networks must develop an understanding of communities to implement 
an effective and tailored disaster response through sensemaking. These qualities include 
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the core shared values, cultures, or structures that influence individual perceptions, and 
societal weaknesses highlighted by vulnerable populations. This understanding reduces 
confusion and enables effective decision-making by reducing uncertainty. Social media 
and other online platforms enable information-sharing for sensemaking, contributing to 
this understanding through a network of individuals reporting information about the 
disaster and requirements. By tailoring the response, responder networks meet the unique 
needs of the community, thereby increasing trust. As shown in Figure 1, the sensemaking 
process recommended by this model contributes to upholding democratic social and 
political institutions when responders develop a situational understanding of the effects of 
a disaster and false information on the environment and people.  
Sensemaking also supports political institutions by reducing confusion and 
polarization fostered online. Governments should take actions to support the sensemaking 
process and increase trust by encouraging media literacy; reducing the monetary benefit 
for platforms that host false, misleading, or polarizing information; and correcting 
inaccurate information online. This model recommends that governments, national leaders, 
and community leaders leverage the sensemaking process to guide online conversations 
and communities by reducing the flow and reception of mis-, dis-, and mal-information 
online through critical thinking and online social norms, thereby reducing the polarization 
that undermines democratic stability. 
c. Meaning-Making 
Leaders inspire confidence and enhance their credibility through the process of 
meaning-making, while considering the values, structures, and weaknesses of 
communities. Boin et al. define meaning-making as “offering a situational definition and 
narrative that is convincing, helpful, and inspiring to citizens and responders.”435 This 
research finds that trust is enhanced when leaders successfully communicate positive 
meaning-making to citizens. By engaging in meaning-making, leaders can also reduce 
polarization exacerbated online by mis-, dis-, and mal-information by offering an inspiring 
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narrative. However, false information spread online can also disrupt the process of 
meaning-making. The model in Figure 1 recommends that leaders engage in an effective 
meaning-making process with individuals and communities to enhance trust and reduce 
polarization, which in turn strengthens the social and political institutions necessary for 
democratic stability. 
d. Community Stabilization 
Developing social structures, with an emphasis on civic engagement and social 
responsibility, increases citizen trust in governments and their capacity to respond to the 
disaster. The first step is for responder networks to understand the composition and needs 
of the community, and the next is to encourage social cohesion, social responsibility, and 
community involvement in the disaster response. Responders should tailor their disaster 
response to account for power disparities and social considerations in the community once 
these factors are understood. Networks of responders should consider community values, 
such as respect for human rights and dignity, when considering disaster response strategies. 
These networks should also seek to encourage citizens to adopt social responsibility, which 
encourages social cohesion and leads to community involvement in the disaster response. 
Citizens can engage in these actions both online and in person, thereby contributing to the 
effectiveness of the response and enabling community stabilization. This model 
recommends that responders act to stabilize communities by developing an understanding 
of values and community composition that contributes to building strong social structures, 
and encouraging civic engagement and social responsibility to uphold social and political 
institutions of a democracy. 
e. Adaptation 
Disasters and false information both disrupt systems and contribute to the 
complexity of the operational environment. Many disaster coordinating agencies are 
constrained by policies or regulations that disincentivize adaptation. However, adaptation 
is essential for building individual and community resilience and decreasing vulnerability, 
as well as implementing policies in this new and evolving information environment. 
Additionally, innovation is required when responding to a catastrophic disaster, including 
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the development of atypical solutions to complex problems such as new capabilities for 
funding opportunities. Last, social media provides an opportunity for improvisation and 
adaptation by establishing a new information environment for communicating with 
citizens. Responders should prepare to adapt to the unpredictable forces of disasters and 
false information spread on new online platforms, and innovate through atypical and ethical 
solutions that enable an effective disaster response. This model recommends that responder 
networks prepare to improvise or rapidly adapt to the urgency and ambiguity of the 
situation and leverage the new information environment to support the social, political, and 
economic institutions of a democracy.  
f. Ethics and Equity 
Responder networks must acknowledge and understand the unique qualities of 
communities, including existing vulnerabilities such as social structures and power 
imbalances, to provide equitable support to all citizens. Additionally, these networks 
should seek to understand systemic factors that contribute to individual, group, or 
community vulnerability and resilience. Establishing this understanding requires 
significant effort toward coordination and alignment, not just between levels of 
government but with the whole of community. It also requires an understanding of 
community structures and values, as well as socioeconomic and other social inequities. 
Unfortunately, false information spread online exacerbates societal divides and can 
increase these power imbalances. Understanding these disparities and forces allows 
governments, leaders, and disaster coordinating agencies to tailor the crisis response to 
meet citizen and community needs, especially vulnerable individuals.  
Responders should use this information to customize processes or capabilities to 
the needs of the citizens by accounting for social inequalities. Disaster relief funding and 
social programs should be tailored to the needs of individuals and ensure that government 
and community-based relief programs are well coordinated and equity-focused. Models 
such as the crisis standards of care developed by the medical community can provide a 
template for adaptation while implementing an ethical and equitable response to disasters, 
adhering to values, and considering the needs of the community. Government and 
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community groups should be prepared to provide for the basic needs of all individuals 
through social and other supplemental disaster relief programs that ensure human rights 
are upheld and equity is considered in providing disaster services. The model in Figure 1 
recommends that responder networks adapt their disaster response activities to the 
structures and vulnerabilities of the community to support the social, political, and 
economic institutions of a democracy through the ethical and equitable provision of 
resources.  
2. Model Implementation by Responder Networks 
Volunteer and community responders, as well as in-person and online communities, 
contribute to the implementation of this model. They support both the social and political 
institutions of a democracy. Governments, on the other hand, support the economic and the 
social and political institutions of a democracy. Typically, governments are the most 
significant contributor to economic disaster relief funding and recovery programs aimed at 
stimulating the economy. Together, the disaster response network comprises volunteer and 
community responders, communities, and governments that support the legitimacy of 
democratic institutions. 
In addition to responding to disasters, responder networks build social capital 
through civic engagement and cooperation, mobilizing volunteers and community 
responders. Mobilization is manifested in disasters through emergence, in democracies 
through citizen engagement, and in the online communities formed on social media 
platforms. Additionally, social capital can be built through networks and trusted 
relationships.436 In particular, Tierney identifies three types of social capital: within a 
group, between groups, and with governments or other powerful groups.437 Networks that 
include all three of these forms of social capital are best postured for success through 
cooperation and access to resources.438 Nevertheless, democracies can be undermined by 
the spread of false information online, as well as societal disruptions such as displacement 
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of individuals or damage to communities and infrastructure following a disaster. The model 
in Figure 1 recommends that communities, responders, and governments help reduce these 
disruptions to democracy by implementing responder actions through social capital formed 
within these networks via mobilization. 
3. Implementation Strategies 
The implementation of the social response to disasters model requires collaboration 
among responder networks to uphold the integrity of their democracies in times of crisis. 
Before a disaster, these networks should take the following actions: 
• Develop and strengthen response networks and build social capital within, 
outside, and with powerful groups. 
• Ensure that pre-disaster planning and policy development include 
considerations of community culture and values, vulnerabilities and 
resilience, and historic inequalities. 
• Consider models such as the crisis standards of care to enable 
considerations of ethical and equitable decision-making for application of 
scarce resources. 
• Engage with civil groups and citizens before the disaster to build social 
structures and encourage resilience through the development of social 
cohesion and responsibility in a community, support of individual human 
rights, and mechanisms to support individual capacity to adapt to the 
stressors of a crisis. 
• Ensure that innovation and adaptation are allowed and encouraged within 
pre-disaster planning and policy frameworks. 
• Implement programs that reduce the flow or reception of mis-, dis-, and 
mal-information and increase critical-thinking skills and media literacy. 
Consider opportunities to reduce the profit for media platforms that host 
false, misleading, or polarizing information. 
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• Develop structures that enable networks to counter false information by 
correcting online rumors or providing accurate information to aid the 
sensemaking process and reduce polarization. 
While responding to a disaster, responder networks should take the following 
actions: 
• Refine disaster plans to ensure that response strategies consider 
vulnerability and resilience and that innovation and adaptation are 
encouraged. 
• Understand the effect of disasters on communities through a shared 
sensemaking process between governments, individuals, and community 
groups.  
• Adapt response strategies to the cultures or community values of those 
affected by the disaster. 
• Leverage data analysis and ethical frameworks to allocate disaster 
resources equitably when these capabilities are insufficient to meet the 
needs of citizens and, therefore, require prioritization.  
• Ensure that systemic societal inequities are not perpetuated through 
disaster relief programs or funding. 
• Ensure that social capital is not destroyed through displacement and 
mental health challenges—resulting from the effects of the disaster and the 
spread of false information—by acknowledging these challenges and 
providing survivors with robust mental and public health services. 
During and after a disaster, responder networks should take the following actions: 
• Engage directly with citizens through social media to support 
sensemaking, shape the narrative through meaning-making, and help 
counter mis-, dis-, and mal-information effects on the population. 
• Coordinate with and support self-organizing online communities to 
contribute to sensemaking and help solve complex problems. 
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• Understand community resilience and vulnerability with a focus on equity 
and human rights to ensure that disaster relief grants are sufficient to meet 
individual requirements.  
• Provide for the basic needs of all individuals through social programs and 
supplemental disaster relief funds following a disaster. 
• Ensure community and government coordination to enable short- and 
long-term individual and community recovery after a disaster. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Although the existing literature describes the importance of social coherence and 
civic engagement as well as the effect of these structures on communities and individuals 
after catastrophic disasters, additional research could reveal how to work within a 
community to build and maintain these structures. Similarly, the role of social 
responsibility in disasters could be explored further, perhaps using different public health 
strategies and outcomes for COVID-19. Additionally, as community structures change due 
to mobile populations and the emergence of mega-cities and other densely populated areas, 
additional research could be applied to understanding social coherence challenges faced by 
these transformations. Last, as this thesis is internationally focused, the response to and 
coordination of transnational disasters and the exploration of social implications, 
governance structures, and responses to disasters that cross borders in an increasingly 
connected world could be further explored.  
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